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When a Pittsburgh area employer rejected his demand for a
$0.60 per hour raise and offered only $0.10, a lone Teamster truck
driver struck and single-handedly established a picket line. Almost
300 other company employees, represented by the Steelworkers,
honored the picket line. As the strike continued, the Teamster's de-
mands escalated. After two-and-one-half weeks, the strike ended
when the employer agreed to a $0.65 per hour wage increase and a
$0.19 an hour cost-of-living increase.'
In the coal fields of western Pennsylvania, small bands of roving
pickets, with real or imagined grievances against their own employ-
ers, frequently travel from mine to mine. At each site, mines close as
workers refuse to cross the picket lines established by their fellow
mine workers. In only the first nine months of 1975, work stoppages
caused by these roving pickets allegedly cost 1,368,000 man-days of
lost production, approximately $76 million in lost wages, 16.5 mil-
lion tons of unmined coal, and $22 million in lost royalties to the
financially starved pension and welfare trust funds.2
These examples demonstrate a proposition fundamental to
American labor relations: "[R]espect for the integrity of the picket
line may well be the source of strength of the whole collective bar-
gaining process . . . .I A union's economic leverage, symbolized
by the right to strike, becomes a mere mirage unless employees re-
* A.B. 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1971, Columbia University School of Law;
LL.M. (Labor Law) 1975, George Washington University National Law Center, Member,
New York and District of Columbia Bars; Assistant General Counsel, Eastern Conference of
Teamsters.
1. Money, 5 (Oct. 1978).
2. Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. UMW, 431 F. Supp. 774, 777 (W.D. Pa. 1977),
affdinpart, rev'd in part, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978).
3. NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826
(1971).
spect the union's picket line; and without the realistic threat of a suc-
cessful strike, a union's collective bargaining arsenal is limited to
moral suasion, otherwise known as collective begging. Naturally, a
strike will succeed only if employees in the striking bargaining unit
respect the picket line. As the Teamster-Steelworker example illus-
trates, the striking unit's leverage increases if employees in other
units at the primary site respect the picket line. If the union can
extend its picket line to other, secondary,4 facilities of the struck em-
ployer, the union's pressure increases dramatically as employees at
other locations support their fellow employees by honoring the pick-
et line. Finally, if employees of other employers can refuse to cross
the picket line at the primary and secondary sites, the union's lever-
age is reinforced, as interruptions in the transportation of material to
and from the picketed facility render continued operations with non-
striking employees, replacements, and supervisors less effective.
To enhance the effectiveness of its strike, a union may resort to
a variety of tactics. It may exhort workers in the name of self-inter-
est and union solidarity.5 It may compel members to respect a picket
line by threatening to file internal union charges, possibly resulting
in fines.6 Or it may simply rely on employees' fear of social ostri-
cism7 or physical violence.8
Conversely, an employer has a legitimate economic interest in
maintaining normal operations despite the strike. This concern may
prompt economic and legal countermeasures to end the strike or to
induce employees to cross the picket line. Economic tactics include
the discharge or replacement of strikers and sympathy strikers. Liti-
gation may include suits to enjoin the primary strike or the right to
respect a picket line, and damage actions based upon the allegedly
unlawful sympathy strike.
The rights of employees to respect a picket line have been dis-
cussed in a comprehensive manner. Almost uniformly, these articles
suggest a narrow construction of the right to respect a picket line9
4. "Primary" and "secondary" sites refer, respectively, to the original site of the labor
dispute and to other facilities of the employer to which the picket line may be extended. The
extension of a lawful picket line to another division of the struck employer may constitute
unlawful secondary activity. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text infra.
5. L.A. Young Spring & wire Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 868, 874 (1946), enf. denied on other
grounds, 163 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 837 (1948).
6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Machinists, Oak-
land Lodge 284, 190 N.L.R.B. 208 (1971), afl'dsub nom., Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d
416 (9th Cir. 1972).
7. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 383, 389 (1950).
8. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, 130 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1209-11, 1213-15 (1961), modified,
137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enfdsub nom., Teamsters, Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964); Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typo-
graphical Union 53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1228-31 (6th Cir. 1975) (Appendix), cert. denied, 428 U.S.
909 (1976).
9. Carney and Florsheim, The Treatment of Refusals to Cross Picket Lines:. "By-Paths
andIndirect Crookt Ways, " 55 CORNELL L. REV. 940 (1970); Connolly and Connolly, Employ-
and criticize the Supreme Court's decision restricting district court
jurisdiction to enjoin sympathy strikes.'" To the contrary, this article
will support a broad right of employees to respect a picket line, even
one established at another employer's premises, and suggest a nar-
rower view of an employer's right to seek damages for sympathetic
activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act.
II. Section 7 and the Right to Strike
Responding to decades of judicial abuse of the equity power,
Congress adopted the Norris-LaGuardia Act" to shelter peaceful
strikes, picketing, and boycotts against injunctions routinely issued
at the request of employers. Judicial restraint proved insufficient, as
employers fought their employees' attempts to organize. Employees,
on the other hand, realized that their only weapon was the strike. In
fact, the Norris-LaGuardia Act permitted both labor and manage-
ment to resort to economic warfare. In this battle, however, the em-
ployer held the dominant position. Employees seeking to organize
could be discharged and blacklisted. Company-dominated unions
could preclude effective employee representation. And when a
union could compel recognition, it could not guarantee that the em-
ployer would bargain in good faith. Under these circumstances, only
the strongest unions survived, and economic warfare, and usually
violence, was prevalent.
In 1935, Congress restructured the national labor policy. The
Wagner Act 2 marked the end of the government's nominally lais-
sez-faire attitude and announced affirmative support for the strug-
gling American labor movement. The thrust of the new policy
protected "the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 13 Its goal was
the promotion of a rough measure of equality of bargaining power
ers'Rights Relative to Sympathy Strikes, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 121 (1975-76); Getman, The Protec-
tion ofEconomic Pressure By Section 7 ofthe National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
1195 (1967); Haggard, Picket Line Observance as a Protected Concerted Activity, 53 N. CAR. L.
REV. 43 (1974). Contra, Note, Respectfor Picket Lines, 42 IND. L.J. 536 (1967); Note, Picket
Line Observance.- The Board and the Balance o/ Interest, 79 YALE L.J. 1369 (1970).
10. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) is criticized in Smith, The
Supreme Court, Boys Market Labor Injunctions, and Sympathy Work Stoppages, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 321 (1977). See also Comment, Court May Enjoin Sympathy Strike where Purpose and
Effect is to Compel Concession fArbitrable Issue, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 507 (1978); Comment,
Sister Union Strikes and "No-Strike" Clauses. The Logic and Necessity of a Presumption of
Inclusivity, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1044-60 (1974).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (1976). For an excellent review of this abuse, see F.
FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
12. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1976).
13. Id at § 151.
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between employee groups and management. Congress expressed the
cornerstone of this policy in Section 7 as a simple declarative sen-
tence:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.14
The strike has long been recognized as a proper, legitimate, and
significant form of protected, concerted activity, and as the "ultimate
weapon in labor's arsenal . . . ."'I Pursuant to the command of
Section 13,16 the National Labor Relations Board and the courts
have traditionally given a "generous interpretation" to the right of
employees to engage in such activity. 7 Moreover, Congress explic-
itly provided that the benefits of the Act extend to striking employ-
ees. '8 Accordingly, it is well settled that while an employer may hire
permanent replacements for his striking employees and need not dis-
charge the replacements at the end of the strike to make way for the
returning strikers,' 9 the employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act2"
if he discharges employees for such concerted activity.2' Such dis-
charges also violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act22 if they are at least
partially for the purpose of discouraging union activity.23 Even
when employee activity is not protected by Section 7, an employer
violates Section 8(a)(3) by seizing upon such unprotected activity as
a pretext for the discharge.24
14. 49 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). In 1947, Congress amended § 7 to include "the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment .... " 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1978).
15. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967). See also NLRB v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak
Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 75 (1956); Amalgamated Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340
U.S. 383, 389, 404 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien,
339 U.S. 454, 457 (1950).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976): "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided
for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
17. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-35 (1963); accord, NLRB v. Interna-
tional Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672-73 (1951) and cases cited at note 15 supra.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) defines "employee" to include "any individual whose work
has ceased in consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute. . . and who
has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment .
19. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
• . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 ....
21. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1978): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
. . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .
23. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 53 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB (Overnite Transportation Co.), 364 F.2d
682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
III. The Right to Respect a Picket Line
As an integral part of the strike, employees and unions establish
and maintain picket lines, with the recognized and legitimate pur-
pose of causing other employees to withhold their services as an ad-
ditional method of making the strike more effective. The picket line
is no less legitimate because the union hopes that employees of neu-
tral employers may honor the picket line. But as the Supreme Court
has held, "picketing which induces secondary employees to respect a
picket line is not the equivalent of picketing which has an object of
inducing those employees to engage in concerted conduct against
their employer in order to force him to refuse to deal with the struck
employer."25 Thus, picketing at the premises of the struck employer
is presumptively lawful, even though it necessarily inconveniences
other employers.
Although the right to solicit support for a primary picket line is
thus protected by the Act, several courts and commentators have
questioned the right of employees to honor a primary picket line es-
tablished at another employer's premises. Most recently, in NLRB v.
William S, Carroll, Inc.,26 the First Circuit expressly questioned the
right to respect a stranger picket line, thereby reemphasizing an ap-
parent division among the circuits. Before attempting to resolve this
conflict, it is helpful to trace the progression of the right to respect a
picket line from the simplest situation involving one employer, one
unit, and one location to the most complex situation involving unre-
lated employers.
A. Picket Line Situations
1. The Pickets and the Honorer are employed in the same bar-
gaining unit by a single employer. -Examples of this simplest situa-
tion are obvious. A discharged employee may establish a picket line
seeking to rouse his fellow employees to economic action to secure
his reinstatement. Union members may strike and request non-
members to aid them in their struggle. Here, the law is clear: "An
25. Electrical Workers, Local 761 v. NLRB (General Electric Co.), 366 U.S. 667, 673-74
(1961). In General Electric, the Board and Court held that "common situs" or "ambulatory"
picketing was presumptively valid even if conducted on the secondary employer's premises if
(a) the picketing is limited to times when the primary employer is at the secondary employer's
premises, (b) the primary employer is engaged in his normal business at the secondary site, (c)
the picketing is reasonably close to the primary employer's location on the secondary site, and
(d) the pickets clearly disclose that the dispute is only with the primary employer. Id at 677,
citing Moore Dry Dock, 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549 (1950). The Court further held that the primary
employer could establish and maintain a separate gate, which could be used only by employ-
ees of neutral employers performing work unrelated to the normal operations of the primary
employer and would not necessitate the curtailing of the primary's operations absent the strike.
Id at 680-81. Strikers picketing at such a separate gate would violate the secondary boycott
prohibitions of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
26. 578 F.2d 1 (ist Cir. 1978), denying enforcement of 232 N.L.R.B. 1131 (1977).
employee who refuses to cross a picket line is in effect joining the
strike and engaging in concerted activities protected by the Act."
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In his seminal opinion in NLRB v. Peter Cailer Kohler Swiss Choco-
lates Co., Inc. ,21 the eminent Judge Learned Hand expressed the ra-
tionale of these cases:
When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with
a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out on
strike in his support, they engage in a "concerted activity" for
"mutual aid or protection," although the aggrieved workman is
the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the out-
come. The rest know that by their action each one of them assures
himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one
whom they are all then helping; and the solidarity so established is
"mutual aid" in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.29
2. The Pickets and the Honorer are employed in separate bar-
gaining units of a single employer. -In this situation, a unit of strik-
ing production employees requests clerical employees to respect their
picket line established at their common place of employment. The
clerical employees either refuse to cross the picket line for any pur-
pose or agree to cross the picket line to perform their regular clerical
duties, but refuse to perform production work as replacements for
the strikers.
The Board and courts have consistently held that Section 7 pro-
tects a non-unit employee's total refusal to cross a picket line of fel-
low employees.3" Although the sympathy striker is not primarily or
directly involved in the economic strike, his refusal to work during
the strike literally gives assistance to the union. Furthermore, he has
a substantial and legitimate interest in the successful prosecution of
the strike because of the possible reciprocal effect improved condi-
tions in another bargaining unit may have on his own conditions of
employment.3' He may also reasonably expect that his support for
the production workers will ensure their support if and when his
clerical unit ever strikes. Thus, his honoring the picket line consti-
tutes "mutual aid and protection" as well as assistance to a labor
27. NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 1953), enfg, 97
N.L.R.B. 820 (1951); Accord, NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 53 (1972); Stepp's
Friendly Ford, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1963), en'din part, 338 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1964);
John S. Swift Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 394 (1959), en'din pertinent part, 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1960);
Kitty Clover, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1665, enf'd 208 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1953); Sunshine Hosiery
Mills, I N.L.R.B. 664, 673 (1936).
28. 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
29. Id at 505-06, quoted with approval in Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v.
NLRB, 386 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1967).
30. See, e.g., City Yellow Cab Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 994 (1963), en/'d, 344 F.2d 575,582 (6th
Cir. 1965); Montag Bros., Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 366 (1943) enf'd, 140 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1944).
31. Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502, 505-06 (1965); Canada Dry Corp., 154
N.L.R.B. 1763, 1769 (1965); Texas Foundries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1642, 1683 (1952), enfdenied
on other grounds, 211 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1954).
organization. Moreover, this rationale applies regardless of whether
the honorer was represented by the striking union,32 by a different
union,33 or was unrepresented.34
The same Section 7 rationale applies in unfair labor practice
strikes. Here, however, the Board has indicated that the- sympathy
striker's representation might be relevant. In Brown andRoot, Inc. 31
a divided Board stated that non-represented employees have inter-
ests related to those of represented employees and were "substan-
tially affected and aggrieved" by an unlawful refusal to bargain with
a union in a separate unit.36 On the other hand, employees repre-
sented by unions with which the employer was lawfully bargaining
were not "immediately affected or aggrieved" by the unfair labor
practice.37 Thus, though both groups were protected by Section 7,
the non-represented group assumed the status of unfair labor prac-
tice strikers, while the represented employees were protected only as
economic strikers. Subsequently, the Board has questioned and lim-
ited this distinction. In A. 0. Smith Corp. ,38 the Board held that a
discriminatory discharge, unlike a refusal to bargain, affected all em-
ployees, for they had no reason to believe that their employer would
act differently according to their union status. 39 Brown and Root's
distinction ignores the Kohler rationale of mutuality and unrealisti-
cally suggests that the employer will ignore bargaining unit lines in
discharge cases, but not in refusals to bargain. Industrial reality sup-
ports no such distinction.
Employees willing to cross a picket line to do their regular work,
but unwilling to act as strikebreakers, are also protected by Section
7. Such a refusal constitutes "mutual aid or protection" even though
the employee "has no immediate stake in the outcome of the
32. City Yellow Cab Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 994 (1963), enfd, 344 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1965);
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 341 (1976) (different locals affiliated with the same
international union).
33. Kellogg Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 948, 949 (1971), enf'd, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 850 (1972); Difco Laboratories, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 2149, 2151-52 (1968), enfd per
curiam, 427 F.2d 170, 172 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970); L.A. Young Spring &
Wire Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 868, 874 (1946), enf. denied on other grounds, 163 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 837 (1948) ("[iit is almost a rule of trade union ethics for one labor
union to respect a picket line established by another").
34. Union Carbide Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. 989, 992 (1969), enfd, in part, 440 F.2d 54, 55
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971); Canada Dry Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 1763, 1769
(1965).
35. 99 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1952) (Member Houston dissenting), enfdinpart, denied in part,
203 F.2d 139 (8th Cir.), rehearing denied, 206 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1953).
36. Id at 1035.
37. Id at 1037.
38. 132 N.L.R.B. 339 (1961), modified, 137 N.L.R.B. 361 (1962), enfd in part, denied in
part, 343 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1965).
39. Id at 340 note 5. More recently, in a case involving both a discriminatory discharge
and an unlawful refusal to bargain, the Board did not discuss the Brown andRoot issue. Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 341 (1976).
strike."'  The refusal is protected even when the employee is willing
to perform struck work if other employees do likewise, for the will-
ingness to cross the picket line indicates only the depth of the em-
ployee's resolve to refrain from conduct harmful to the strikers and
does not affect the degree of protection afforded by Section 7.41 The
Board and the courts have consistently rejected arguments that this
selective refusal to work constitutes "insubordination" and have in-
stead analogized the refusal with a protected "partial strike."42
While an employee cannot collect full pay while doing only part of
his work, and be a partial striker in that sense, his willingness to do
his regular work does not justify compelling him, under penalty of
discharge, to do struck work. The touchstone for protected activity is
whether the particular activity is so indefensible as to justify a dis-
charge.43 Judged by this standard, a sympathy striker merits treat-
ment as a striker, not discharge for insubordination.
3. The Pickets and the Honorer are employed at separate loca-
tions of a single employer. -Historically, striking unions seek the aid
of other employees of the struck employer. This call for concerted
activity is normally effectuated by extending the picket line to other
locations of the primary employer. "Primary employees have tradi-
tionally been assured the right to take concerted action against their
employer. . . whether or not the resolution of the particular dispute
directly affects all of them."" In the world of corporate giants, em-
ployees can influence their employer's bargaining decisions only by
seeking help from fellow employees at other locations of the em-
ployer.
Until 1970, a union enjoyed the right to extend a lawful primary
picket line to other locations of the same corporate employer. 5 In
40. McCann Steel Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 12, 18 (1971), enfd 80 L.R.R.M. 2651 (6th Cir.
1972); Accord, Valmac Industries, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 580, 582 (1975), enf'dper curiam, 533
F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1976); General Tire & Rubber Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 227, 229-230 (1971),
enfd, 451 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1971).
41. Cooper Thermometer Co., 154, N.L.R.B. 502, 505 (1965).
42. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 257, 259 (1st Cir. 1971); Virginia
Stage Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 499, 503 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971);
Rapid Roller Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 557, 596 note 52 (1941), enf'd in pert. part, 126 F.2d 452, 461
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 650 (1942); Niles Fire Brick Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 426, 435 (1941),
enfdper curiam, 128 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1942). Cf. Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686
(1938) (concerted refusal to perform overtime), cited with approval in UAW, Local 232 v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 255 (1949).
43. Harneschfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686 (1938), cited with approval in UAW, Local
232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 255 (1949).
44. Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v, NLRB, 386 U.S. 664, 668 (1967).
45. See, e.g., Milwaukee Plywood Co. v. NLRB, 285 F.2d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1960); Alex-
ander Warehouse & Sales Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 916 918-20 (1960). In Montgomery Ward & Co.,
122 N.L.R.B. 1264, 1270 (1959), the Board ruled that Section 8(b)(4) "do[es] not isolate one
store in the Company's chain from other stores therein, nor do those provisions provide that
economic pressure may be applied upon a primary employer only at that segment of his opera-
tions at which the immediate dispute exists."
the Hearst Doctrine,4 6 the Board held for the first time that Section
8(b)(4)(B) of the Act 4 7 bans the extension of picket lines to separate
divisions of a single corporation. Before a union may now extend a
picket line to another subdivision of a corporate employer, it must
first discover whether the corporate parent maintains "actual or ac-
tive control of the labor relations policies" of the divisions, or
whether the parent served simply in an advisory capacity during bar-
gaining sessions, with final authority regarding management propos-
als residing in the presidents of the divisions.48
When a picket line is legitimately extended, sympathetic em-
ployees at any facility of the common employer are protected by Sec-
tion 7. Thus, any employee who honors a picket line established
because of unfair labor practices directed against any other em-
ployee "has a sufficiently immediate relation to such practices" to be
protected by Section 7, irrespective of whether the employees are at
separate locations, in different unions, or are not eligible for mem-
bership in the striking union.49 Employees respecting an extended
economic picket line similarly realize that support for their fellow
employees will result in greater solidarity and, therefore, improved
conditions for all employees.
50
4. The Honorer encounters Pickets at another Employer'sprem-
ises. -Frequently in the transportation and construction industries,
but occasionally in any business, an employee may encounter a law-
ful, primary picket line around the premises of an employer other
than his own. If the employee honors the picket line, he aids the
strikers by increasing pressure on their employer. Yet this same con-
duct also inconveniences his own employer, who, at worst may lose a
customer and at best must reassign an employee to replace the sym-
pathetic striker. In this situation, the honorer's employer deserves
considerable sympathy, for it bears no responsibility for, and cannot
resolve, the dispute that caused the strike and resulting picket line.
Understandably, this sympathy creates tensions between the em-
ployee's Section 7 rights and the employer's inherent right to operate
46. San Francisco Examiner, 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enfdper curiam, 443 F.2d 1173
(9th Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 404 U.S. 1081 (1971); Vulcan Materials Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 540
(1974), en/'d, 543 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 967 (1977); Baltimore News
American Div., 185 N.L.R.B. 593 (1970), enfd, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976) prohibits a union from striking or picketing with the
object of forcing a "person," or neutral employer, to cease doing business with another "per-
son," the primary employer.
48. Vulcan Materials Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 540, 543 (1974).
49. NLRB v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F.2d 18, 23 (9th Cir. 1938). See also, Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 341 (1976).
50. M/G Transport Services, 204 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1973), citing Peter Cailler Kohler
Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942); W-I Canteen Service, Inc., 238
N.L.R.B. No. 87 (1978), enf. denied, W-I Canteen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738 (7th
Cir. 1979).
its business efficiently. Not surprisingly, therefore, this tension is re-
flected in the opinions of the Board and courts and in academic criti-
cism of the Board's position.
The Board holds that Section 7 protects an employee who hon-
ors a picket line at another employer's premises. Respect for the in-
tegrity of the picket line, either at the employee's own premises or
the premises of another employer, is a source of strength for the col-
lective bargaining process as a whole, and through that process each
employee ultimately benefits, even though he may have no immedi-
ate stake in the dispute. Whether employees refuse to cross a picket
line set up by other employees at the same plant or whether employ-
ees respect a picket line established at another employer's premises,
the self-interest at stake is essentially the same; there is an expecta-
tion of receiving concerted support from other employees should it
be needed at a future time and there is a reasonable possibility that
improved area standards will ultimately redound to his benefit. In
sum, the Board's position in this situation is essentially the same as
in the less complex situations. "[T]o hold otherwise would be to hold
that although Congress protected the fundamental right of labor or-
ganizations to engage in primary picketing, it withheld this protec-
tion from the normal employee response which makes that right
effective." 5
Critics of the Board's position uniformly argue that employees
respecting a lawful primary picket line at another employer's prem-
ises lack an economic interest in the primary dispute and, therefore,
their sympathetic activity is unprotected, absent any "mutuality."
Most recently, the First Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit in expres-
sing doubt that "an employee's refusal to cross a picket line directed
at a stranger employer is 'concerted activit[y] for. . . mutual aid or
protection' secured by section 7 of the Act. . " 52 The same posi-
tion is forcefully argued by several commentators.53 Their position
assumes, of course, that Section 7 protects only clearly mutual eco-
nomic interests. Neither the legislative history nor the realities of the
workplace support this conclusion. To the contrary, Section 7 ex-
51. West Coast Casket Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 820, 823 (1951), enfd, 205 F.2d 902 (9th Cir.
1953).
52. NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1978). The court, however,
denied enforcement on another basis; that the employer had a legitimate business reason for
discharging the sympathy striker, even if his activity were protected by Section 7. Id at 5. For
a discussion of the "business necessity" defense, see notes 196-223 and accompanying text
infra. The court's skepticism is reflected in other decisions. See also, NLRB v. C.K. Smith &
Co., Inc., 569 F.2d 162, 165 n.1 (Ist Cir. 1977) ("disciplined employees' self-interest is not
directly or indirectly implicated in the primary strike"); G & P Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 92
L.R.R.M. 3652, 3655 n.2 (4th Cir. 1976); Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 499, 502
n.4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971).
53. See generally Carney & Florsheim, supra note 9; Getman, supra note 9; Haggard,
supra note 9.
plicitly protects the right to "assist labor organizations" as well as the
right to take "other concerted activities for the purpose of. . . other
mutual aid or protection.
5 4
(a) Legislative history. -According to Senator Wagner, Sec-
tion 7 of the Act was "nothing more than a verbatim recital of the
various rights granted employees under Section 7(a)" of the National
Industrial Recovery Act." Interpreting Section 7(a), the original
Board issued a series of formal advisory opinions that essentially
equated sympathy strikers and regular strikers. 6 Opponents of the
Wagner Bill immediately recognized that Section 7 "would give em-
ployees the legal right to 'assist' labor organizations by means of
sympathetic strikes . . . . While the statements of a bill's oppo-
nents are not the strongest evidence of legislative intent,58 their fears
reflected the general thrust of Section 7(a) as interpreted by the origi-
nal Board, whose decisions were later of material assistance in inter-
preting and applying Section 7 of the Act.59 Thus, although the
legislative history is not conclusive, it does support the construction
that Section 7 protects striking employees, including sympathy strik-
ers.
60
In 1947 a Republican-dominated Congress sought to "balance"
54. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (emphasis added).
55. Memorandum comparing a Bill Introduced by Senator Wagner with a Bill Reported
by Senator Walsh March 1I, 1935, at 25-26. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LA-
BOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935 at 1350 (1949) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935].
The text of § 7(a) provided, in pertinent part, that "employees shall have the right to organize
and bargain collectively" and that "no employee and no one seeking employment shall be
required as a condition of employment to. . . refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a
labor organization of his own choosing." 48 Stat. 198 (1933).
56. The Board held that "the most effective manner in which an employer can interfere
with the self-organization of his employees and can prevent them from assisting labor organi-
zations is to require them to agree not to strike." John E. Lucey Shoe Co., 11 D.N.L.R.B. 251,
254 (1935); Vincennes Packing Corp., II D.N.L.R.B. 433, 435 (1935). In Knapp Monarch Co.,
II D.N.L.R.B. 311 (1935), the Board held that members of one union who respected another
union's picket line were properly replaced during the course of the strike, and that the com-
pany's offer of reinstatement as vacancies arose removed any inference of discrimination.
Similarly, in Baltimore Transfer Co., I D.N.L.R.B. 49 (1934), the Board held that employees
of one employer who struck in sympathy with employees at another employee were not enti-
tled to reinstatement because they were legitimately replaced during their strike. These deci-
sions implicitly equate the right to strike with the right to take sympathetic action: the fact of
replacement is relevant only if the underlying activity was protected.
57. Statement of Walter Harneschfeger, II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935 supra note 55, at
1625. Other representatives of industry voiced similar objections. See I LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY 1935, supra note 55, at 409, 564, 726; II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935, supra note 5 at
1748.
58. See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 63940 (1967).
But here the legislative opponent based their fears upon the pronouncements of the Bill's spon-
sor. See footnote 57, supra.
59. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 7 (1936).
60. Both sympathy strikes and refusals to cross a picket line occur for similar reasons and
produce similar results. Any differences arise because a sympathy striker acts wholely out of
sympathy for the initial strikers, while an employee honoring a picket line responds, in part, to
the picket line. There is no reason to believe that in 1935 Congress differentiated between the
two forms of activity.
the Act by creating union unfair labor practices and by restricting
the right to strike. Senator Ball's bill would have imposed criminal
sanctions for specified secondary activity and would have permitted
damage suits against parties engaging in secondary activity. The
bill, however, contained a proviso exempting individual refusals to
cross picket lines in certain circumstances. 6' Congressman Hartley
introduced a bill that declared sympathy strikes unlawful and de-
fined "sympathy strike" to include a strike called because of a dis-
pute involving another employer or other employees of the same
employer.62 Much of the activity declared unlawful in the Hartley
bill was prohibited as an unfair labor practice in Section 8(b)(4) of
the Act, 63 but the Act contains no specific or general reference to
sympathy strikes.' The Ball proviso, with its reference to lawful-
ness, was then included in the Taft-Hartley Act, 65 although secon-
dary boycotts no longer had criminal penalties.66 The legislative
history contains a single reference to the proviso.
67
The Ball proviso is not susceptible of a literal or accurate inter-
pretation. Clearly, the refusal to cross a picket line does not consti-
tute an unfair labor practice. Only unions and employers can
commit unfair labor practices, but the proviso applies to "any per-
son," which includes individuals, corporations, and unions.68  Fur-
thermore, the proviso refers to "his own employer," and only
individual employees have employers. If the proviso were intended
61. Hearings on S. 55 and SJ RES. 22 Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 80th Cong., ist Sess., pt. 1, 15 (1947).
62. H. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24, 44, 50, 61-62 (1947) reprintedin I LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947 at 314-15, 335, 341, 352-53
(1978) [hereinafter cited as "LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1947'].
63. H. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-45, 58-59 (1947), I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1947 supra note 62 at 546-49, 562-63 (1948).
64. Senator Murray did introduce an analysis of the Bill concluding that Section 8(b)(4)
would "outlaw all sympathy strikers." 1I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1947 supra note 62, at 1575,
1579 (1948). Nothing in the statute supports that generalization, although some sympathy
strikes may be secondary boycotts.
65. The proviso states,
Provided, that nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to make un-
lawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other
than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike
ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is
required to recognize under this subchapter.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
66. Congress, however, did provide in § 303(a) that secondary boycotts are "unlawful"
and in § 303(b) that injured parties may sue for damages and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 187(a)(b)
(1976).
67. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 23, (1947) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1947 supra note 62, at 429:
Attached to Section 8(b)(4) is a proviso clause which makes clear that it shall not be
unlawful for any person to refuse to enter upon the premises of any employer (other
than his own) if the employees of that employer are engaged in a strike authorized by
a union entitled to exclusive recognition. In other words, refusing to cross a picket
line or otherwise refusing to engage in strike breaking activities would not be deemed
an unfair labor practice unless the strike is a "wild-cat" strike by a minority group.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976).
to protect unions, the word "unlawful" should mean "unfair labor
practice." On the other hand, if it were meant for employees, the
word should mean "unprotected." Not surprisingly, therefore, the
Board and courts have provided no coherent interpretation of the
proviso. 69  Plainly, however, a refusal to cross a picket line is not
prohibited.
Read together, the legislative histories reveal that in 1935 Con-
gress protected all sympathetic activity and in 1947 Congress prohib-
ited only secondary sympathetic activity. Primary sympathetic
activity was never discussed by the 1947 legislature. Criticism of this
analysis is based upon the belief that Congressional refusal to make
primary sympathetic activity illegal "does not necessarily mean that
Congress therefore intended to make it a protected activity," and the
derivative conclusion that respect for a stranger picket line is neither
protected nor prohibited.7 ° Under this view, an employer cannot ap-
ply to the Board to stop the sympathetic activity, but the employee is
not entitled to the Board's protection when the employer resorts to
self-help. If honoring a picket line were protected prior to 1947,
however, nothing in the 1947 amendments or their legislative history
suggests a reduction to merely permissive status.
The legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin amendments re-
inforces the argument that employees have the right to respect a pri-
mary stranger picket line. In 1959 Congress revised Section 8(b)(4)
and enacted Section 8(e) to close several loopholes in the secondary
boycott provisions of the Act.7 The House Labor Committee report
stated, "It is settled law that the . . . Act does not require a truck-
driver to cross a primary picket line and that the 'pickets may re-
quest him not to enter the strike-bound plant.' "72 It was also clear
69. Several articles summarize the administrative and judicial interpretations of the pro-
viso. See, e.g., Carney and Florsheim, supra, note 9 at 946-50; Haggard, supra, note 9 at 50-51;
O'Connor, Respecting Picket Lines- A Union View, PROCEEDINGS, N.Y. U. SEVENTH ANN.
CONF. ON LAB. 235, 264-269 (1954). In NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co. 345 U.S. 71, 80
(1973), the Court majority construed the proviso as permitting the parties to negotiate a picket
line clause in the contract, but the dissenters concluded that the proviso "reserved to each
employee" the right to respect a picket line. Id at 82 (Black, J., dissenting).
70. Haggard, supra note 9, at 50-51 & n.34.
71. First, while a union could not use coercion to enforce a hot cargo agreement, in
which a company agreed to participate in a secondary boycott, such agreements were permissi-
ble. Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93, 106-07 (1958). Second, the
word "concerted" in § 8(b)(4) would permit secondary inducements to one employee at a time.
NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 671 (1951). Third, because § 8(b)(4)
prohibited secondary inducements only to "employees," secondary inducements to non-em-
ployees (i.e., agricultural or railroad workers) were not unfair labor practices. DiGiorgio Wine
Co,, 87 N.L.R.B. 720, 740-43 (1949), affid, 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
869 (1951). Last, because § 8(b)(4) prohibited only secondary corercion of "employees," em-
ployers and their agents could lawfully succumb to union pressure. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1959) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 at 475-76 (1957) (hereinafter cited as LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY 1959).
72. H. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., 21, (1959) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
that "the right to refuse to cross a primary picket line would not be
affected by" the hot cargo ban in the Kennedy-Ervin bill passed by
the Senate.73 To remove all doubt, the House Committee attached a
disclaimer somewhat broader than the Section 8(b)(4) Ball proviso
that expressly protected the right contractually to protect such refus-
als. 4 The House, however, rejected the Committee bill, replacing it
with the Landrum-Griffin substitute. But the Senate conferees re-
jected the House bill because it "apparently destroys the right to
picket a plant and to honor a picket line even in a strike for higher
wages."75 The Senate conferees prevailed, inserting a proviso that
"nothing contained in [Section 8(b)(4)(B)I shall be construed to
make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or
primary picketing."76 Senator Kennedy explained that the Senate
conferees had secured
[t]he right to engage in primary strikes and picketing even though
the employees of other employers refused to cross the picket line.
The fact of the matter is that there is some question under the
Landrum-Griffin bill whether employees of another employer
could have properly refused not [sic] to cross a picket line in a
primary strike. That has been clarified in the conference report.77
Earlier, Senator Kennedy had stated that the Senate conferees had
"protected the right of employees of a secondary employer, in the
case of a primary strike, to refuse to cross a primary strike picket
line."7
In sum, as the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded, Con-
gress generally accepted Senator Kennedy's belief that the Act pro-
1959 supra note 71, at 779. Almost identical language appears in the Supplemental views of
five members of the Committee, also citing International Rice Milling, Id at 80, I. LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY 1959 supra note 71, at 838. But the majority then alludes to Rockaway News
Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953) for the proposition that the employer has the legal right to
discharge the driver. Id at 21, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1959 supra note 71, at 779. The Court,
however, permitted the discharge only because of the broad no-strike clause. NLRB v. Rocka-
way News Supply Co., 345 U.S. at 79. Congressman Elliott's analysis refers to "the right to
refuse to cross the picket line where an employer is engaged in a primary labor dispute" as
"already contained in the Taft-Hartley Act." II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1959 supra note 71 at
1588(3). See also Remarks of Rep. Cramer, Id at 1619(3), 1620(2), in which he quotes with
approval Senator Kennedy's view that the 1947 Ball proviso "already protects the right of an
employee to refuse to cross the picket line of an employer other than his own" in limited
circumstances.
73. Kennedy-Thompson analysis of S. 155. 1I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1959 supra note 71,
at 1708(3).
74. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1959 supra note 71, at 838, 755-56.
75. Kennedy-Thompson analysis ofS 155. II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1959 supra note 71,
at 1708(3).
76. H. CONF. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., ist Sess., 38, (1959) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1959 supra note 71, at 942. See also I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1959 supra note 71, at
966.
77. II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1959, supra note 71, at 1431-32.
78. Id at 1389(1). Shortly thereafter, Senator Douglas inserted in the Congressional
Record a speech in which he, too, asserted that the conferees had "protected the right of em-
ployees of a secondary employer to refuse to cross a picket line in the case of a primary strike."
Id at 1834(1).
tected employees' rights to honor a primary picket line.79 The
legislative history does not suggest that this right was purely contrac-
tual. Rather, as the various references to Rockaway News suggest,
the right is grounded in the statute, but subject to waiver in a con-
tract.
(b) Case law. -In Cyril de Cordova and Bros. ,8 the Board for
the first time considered the right of an employee to honor a primary
picket line at another employer's premises. A clerk in a stock
brokerage firm routinely spent a small portion of his working hours
at the New York Stock Exchange. When the Exchange's employees
struck, the clerk informed his employer that he was a member of the
striking union and could not cross its picket line. The Board held
that his subsequent discharge violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act.
The Board's three-pronged de Cordova rationale forms the basis
for its current policy. First, the Board reasoned that the clerk's re-
fusal to cross his own union's picket line "constituted an act of assist-
ance to that labor organization within the meating of Section 7.""s l
The union movement was built, in part, upon a foundation of mu-
tual respect of one union for another, and unions, and their mem-
bers, frequently consider it just as improper to cross the picket line of
another bona fide trade union as it is to cross their own union's pick-
et line. The Board has recognized this "rule of trade union ethics,"82
and no longer limits the "right to assist" rationale to members of the
same union. 3 Acceptance of this theory would obviate the need for
exhaustive analysis of the relative economic interest of the pickets,
the honorer and his employer. Instead, the criterion would be
whether any public policy renders this type of "assistance" unworthy
of protection. On the one hand, the tradition of respect and the ex-
79. Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB (Watson-Wilson Transportation System, Inc.), 334
F.2d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 916 (1964). The history does contain one brief
reference to the Board's contrary decision in Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1952), but this
is immediately followed with a reference to Rockaway News, in which the Board implicitly
rejected its Auto Paris rationale. This comment suggests that the original House Committee
bill would have resolved the issue in favor of the right to respect a picket line. II LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1959 supra note 71, at 1777(1).
80. 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950).
81. Id at 1135.
82. LA Young Spring & Wire Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 868 (1949).
83. See, e.g. Kellog Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 948, 949 (1971), enfd, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972). See S.E. Overton Co. v. Teamsters, 115 F. Supp. 764, 769 (W.D.
Mich. 1953) (Section 7 gives "members of the ... Teamsters' Unions . . . the right to assist
other labor organizations, such as the Upholsterers' Union, which is on strike at plaintiff's
plant, provided there is no fraud or violence or unlawful action in the rendering of such assist-
ance"). In non-strike situations, the Board and courts agree that, regardless of union member-
ship, § 7 protects employees who assist a union by communicating information, News-Texan,
Inc. v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1970), and by providing refreshments for pickets,
San Antonio Machine and Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 633, 635, 641-42 (5th Cir. 1966).
press protections of the right to strike militate heavily in favor of
protection. On the other, the congressional objective of limiting the
scope of labor disputes supports a merely permissive status. Because
Congress has clearly accepted judicial rulings that this activity is pri-
mary, and because Congress has expressly directed the courts to "re-
solve doubts and ambiguities in favor of an interpretation. . . which
safeguards the right to strike ... "84 no sound public policy ration-
ale exists for ruling such activity unprotected. That critics of the
Board's stranger picketing position have wholly ignored this ration-
ale is best indicated by their omission of the "assistance" phrase in
their recitation of Section 7.85
The second prong of the de Cordova rationale is that respect for
a stranger picket line constitutes "concerted activit[y] for. . . mutual
aid or protection" within the meaning of Section 7. Recently, the
Supreme Court reiterated the Board's primacy in delineating pre-
cisely the boundaries of the clause.86 At the same time, the Court
acknowledged that Congress "intended to protect employees when
they engaged in otherwise proper concerted activities in support of
employees of employers other than their own."87 Thus, the Board's
interpretation of its own statute is entitled to considerable weight.
In de Cordova, the Board reasoned that the sympathizing clerk
could foresee "the possible reciprocal effect improved conditions in
neighboring and associated businesses might have on his own future
conditions of employment."88 Section 7 does not limit "mutual aid"
to situations in which a direct and immediate financial interest unites
all participating employees.89 By its broad definition of "employee,"
Congress recognized that employees and employers "'not in proxi-
mate relationship may be drawn into common controversies by eco-
nomic forces.' "90
Economic realities do unite employees of different employers.
84. NLRB v. Drivers Local Union 639 (Curtis Bros., Inc.), 362 U.S. 274, 282 (1960).
85. Carney and Florsheim, supra, note 9, at 941; Haggard, supra, note 9, at 44 & n.7;
NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1978). Cf. Getman, supra, note 9, at
1225 n. 128, implicitly rejecting this argument as "astonishingly brief."
86. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978).
87. Id 437 U.S. at 564. Listing such activity protected by the Board and the courts, the
Court cited Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546-47 (1962), enforcing sub nom.
Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964)
(right to honor picket line of another employer's employees); NLRB v. Alamo Express Co.,
430 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971), enforcing 170 N.L.R.B.
315 (1968). The Court expressed no opinion as to the correctness of these decisions. Id at
n. 13. The Court later cited with apparent approval Kellog Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 522-23
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972), which held protected a refusal to cross a picket line
established by employees in a separate unit of the same employer. Id 437 U.S. at 567, n. 17.
88. 91 N.L.R.B. at 1135.
89. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc., v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567-68, (1978) and cases cited therein.
90. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 128-129 (1944), quoting from S.
REP. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., 7 (1935) reprined in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1935 at 2307.
See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234 & n.4 (1941).
Employers are acutely aware of the wage rates paid not only by their
direct competitors, but by every major employer in the area.
Whatever their industry, employers all compete for skilled, efficient
employees, and they realize that, other things being equal, they must
maintain a competitive wage structure to attract and retain good em-
ployees.9' If employees are in the same industry, wage comparabil-
ity will eliminate a function of price competition and promote other
forms of competition.92 Unions and employees are not blind to this
reality. They realize that every wage increase forced upon an area or
competing employer will inevitably and ultimately redound to their
advantage in the form of either increased benefits or increased job
security. Thus, the employees, exercise of the right to assist unions
and employees of other employers will contribute to "the stabiliza-
tion of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and
between industries," a recognized objective of the Act and of labor
unions generally.93
Furthermore, the realities of union solidarity dictate support for
strikes initiated by other unions or aimed at other employers. Em-
ployees and union officials understand that if they cross a union's
picket line today, the offended employees are less likely to honor the
offenders' picket line tomorrow, or next year. The Second Circuit
recognized this mutual backscratching, or "all-for-one, one-for-all,"
philosophy in Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., Inc.:
"[T]hough the immediate quarrel does not itself concern them,...
by extending the number of those who will make the enemy of one
the enemy of all, the power of each is vastly increased."94
Finally, the de Cordova rationale'distinguishes between the pro-
tected refusal to cross a picket line and an unprotected "partial
strike."95 Certain kinds of employee misconduct, falling short of an
unqualified refusal to work, have been denied protection under Sec-
tion 7 because they are calculated randomly to disrupt the em-
ployer's planning and production, and thus to inflict undue hardship
upon him.9 6 But a selective refusal to cross a picket line has none of
91. See, e.g., NLRB v. M.H. Brown Co., 441 F.2d 839, 842 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
Rexall Chemical CO., 418 F.2d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970);
NLRB v. Newton Co., 236 F.2d 438, 446 (5th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. W.T. Grant Co., 208 F.2d
710, 712 (4th Cir. 1953).
92. Compare Dolly Madison Industries, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970) with Mine Work-
ers v. Permington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See also Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers,
Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-24 (1975); California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. AGC, 562
F.2d 607, 613 (9th Cir. 1977).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503
(1940) ("an elimination of price competition based on differences in labor standards is the
objective of any national labor organization").
94. 130 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1942).
95. 91 N.L.R.B. 1121, 1136 (1950). See also, notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
96. Machinists v. Wisconsin Board, 427 U.S. 132, 152 n.14 (1976); Auto Workers v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Comm'n, 336 U.S. 245, 249-250, 264 n.17 (1949).
these consequenses. It is not calculated to harm the secondary em-
ployer, except to the extent necessary to help other striking employ-
ees, and it is predictable, allowing the secondary employer to take
any necessary corrective action, including replacement of the sympa-
thy strikers. Furthermore, the refusal to cross a picket line indicates
assistance to the striking union by utilizing the conventional method,
time-honored in the history of the American labor movement, and,
most importantly, the only practical means available at the time for
that purpose. In short, the injury to the secondary employer is not
greater than-and indeed is much less than-the injury caused by an
unqualified refusal to cross a picket line at his place of business.
Thus, this situation falls within the rationale of decisions holding
that Section 7 protects an employee who refuses altogether to cross a
picket line at his employer's premises.
With the brief exception of the Eisenhower Board,9 7 the Board
has consistently adhered to the de Cordova rationales. Despite some
skepticism by the First and Fourth Circuits, the courts actually
reaching the issue have uniformly held that honoring a primary
picket line at the premises of another employer is protected activity.
In the first such case, the Second Circuit accepted the general princi-
ple,98 but its agreement proved illusory because it limited the em-
ployee's right to his non-working time,99 when the employee would
be least likely to encounter a picket line and when his honoring it
would have the least practical effect. In any event, this limitation
may be rationalized as the precursor of the Board's business neces-
sity justification for replacement."°° The District of Columbia'.' and
97. Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 242 1953); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208
(1961), a'don other grounds, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), a 'd, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964). See, Carney and Florsheim, supra note 9, at 950 and 952
notes 43 and 51 for an analysis of the composition of the Board at the relevant times.
98. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d i1, 113 (2d Cir. 1952) ("[wle accept
the contention of the Board that the refusal of an employee to cross a picket line of another
union than his own at another plant than that of his employer is an exercise of 'the right to...
assist labor organizations . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
. ..mutual aid or protection' which is expressly guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act"), af'don
other grounds, 345 U.S. 71 (1953). The court did question the validity of the "assistance"
rationale. It indicated that the employee's willingness to handle the "hot cargo" if someone
else carried it across the picket line indicated that his concern was his own status as a union
man and not his desire to aid a union. Id at 115. This ignored the fact that a union may
request employees to respect its picket line, but may not request employees not to handle the
struck product outside the picket line. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). Contrast NLRB v.
International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 671 (1951) with Truck Drivers and Helpers,
Local 728 v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 693, 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964).
99. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1952), aft'don
other grounds, 345 U.S. 71 (1953). Dissenting, Judge Clark termed this "a practical nullifica-
tion of the statutory provision." Id at 116.
100. See notes 196-223 and accompanying text infra.
101. Smith's Transit, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1084 (1969), enfdper curiam, 429 F.2d 204,
205 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court faced this issue in two other cases. In Teamster Local 79 v.
NLRB (Redwing Carriers, Inc.), 325 F.2d 1011, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
905 (1964), the court accepted "the findings of the Board" without explanation. The Board
Fifth ' 2 Circuits have adopted the Board's position without qualifi-
cation. The Ninth Circuit has enforced a Board order involving the
reinstatement of a sympathy striker, but refused to consider a "sec-
ondary boycott" argument that had not been raised before the
Board.
0 3
The First and Fourth Circuits' skepticism is based upon their
misinterpretation of distinguishable cases. In Montana-Dakota Utili-
ties Co. v. NLRB, 0 4 the Eighth Circuit assumed that Section 7 pro-
tected employees' rights to "refuse to cross a peaceful picket line set
up [at another employer's premises] by a union in which they have
no direct interest."'0 5 The court held, nonetheless, that the dis-
charges were justified because the union members had contractually
waived their right to honor a picket line." Similarly, in NLRB v.
L. G. Everist, Inc. ,107 the same court accepted, arguendo, the Board's
position,' but adopted the trial examiner's finding that the em-
ployer had a sufficient business reason for refusing to reinstate sym-
pathy strikers.'0 9 The case is further distinguishable because the
area standards pickets were not employed by the struck employer," 0
and the sympathetic strikers had breached a contractual no-strike
clause."' In NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. '12 the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that employee refusals to cross a picket line were unpro-
tected. The court, however, relied, in part, upon the fact that the
sympathetic strikers could have interfered with the contract negotia-
tions which were then being conducted by their own union."t 3 When
the sympathetic employees' union is not engaged in negotiations, the
court has not followed Illinois Bell.'14 Furthermore, insofar as Illi-
nois Bell may be deemed to hold that such refusals constitute indi-
had found that the activity was protected, but that the employer's discharge of a sympathy
striker was justified. 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546-48 (1962). In Truck Drivers and Helpers Local
729 v. NLRB (Overnite Transportation Co.), 364 F.2d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court held
that the discriminatory discharge of a sympathy striker violated § 8(a)(3) without considering
whether the driver's conduct was protected by § 7.
102. Alamo Express, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 315 (1968), enfd, 430 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971).
103. NLRB v. Swain and Morris Construction Co., 431 F.2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1970).
104. 445 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).
105. Id at 1091.
106. Id at 1092-93.
107. 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964) (Justice Blackmun was on the panel majority.).
108. Id at 316.
109. Id at 317-18.
110. L.G. Everist, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 193, (1963), enf. denied, 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964).
But see notes 116-121 and accompanying text infra.
I11. Id, 334 F.2d at 317-18.
112. 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1951).
113. Id at 128-29. The court analogized the sympathizers to "wildcat" strikers and as-
sumed that a successful sympathy strike would necessarily affect the bargaining relationship
then in process. Such reasoning denigrates the entire concept of honoring a picket line: that
by helping another, one ultimately helps himself.
114. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 925 (1975).
vidual, rather than concerted activity, the Seventh Circuit has
subsequently rejected this view."-I Thus, none of these decisions sig-
nify a principled rejection of the Board's interpretation of Section 7.
In sum, both the legislative history and the economic realities of
the work place support the conclusion that Section 7 protects an em-
ployee's right to respect a primary picket line encountered at another
employer's premises.
5. The Honorer encounters stranger pickets at his own em-
ployer's premises. -Employees may encounter stranger pickets at
their place of employment in a variety of circumstances. Common-
situs "' or ambulatory 17 pickets may follow their own employer to
various job sites shared with other employers. Area standards"
l8
pickets may appear at the premises of any employer whose labor
costs fall below those prevailing in his locale. In each case, the pick-
ets have rationally selected their targets to achieve legitimate, pri-
mary objectives. Finally, roving pickets may establish picket lines
for a variety of reasons unrelated to the targeted employer. Such
picketing may be either primary or secondary.
The Board has consistently held that Section 7 protects employ-
ees respecting an area standards, common situs, or ambulatory pick-
et line."1 9 To eliminate competition based on labor cost differentials,
area standards pickets seek to compel the picketed employer to con-
form his wages and working conditions to those prevailing in the
area. Of necessity, successful area standards picketing results in
higher wages and benefits for employees of the target employer.
Thus, employees respecting this stranger picket line share common
interests with the pickets-increased benefits for a group of employ-
ees. In these circumstances, it may be irrelevant that the target em-
ployer is already a party to a substandard contract with another
115. See NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277 F.2d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1960). Accord, Virginia
Stage Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 499, 502 (4th Cir.), ceri. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971). Cf.
Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1347-50 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
935 (1970).
116. In "common situs" situations, the primary employees work on the same general site
as the secondary employees. See, e.g., Local 761, Electrical Workers v. NLRB (General Elec-
tric Co.), 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
117. In ambulatory picketing, striking primary employees follow their employer to any
location where other primary employees may be working, usually to the site of a secondary
employer. See, e.g., Local 294, Teamsters, 194 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1972).
118. Area standards pickets seek to compel an employer to increase its labor costs so that
it does not have a competitive advantage over its presumably unionized competition. See, e.g.,
Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Claude Everett Constr. Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 321
(1962); Hod Carriers' Local 41 (Calumet Contractors Ass'n), 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961).
119. Gould, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1978) (informational picketing); Newbery Energy
Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 436 (1976) (common situs); Congoleum Indus., Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 534, n.l
(1972) (Chairman Miller dissenting) (common situs); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 189
N.L.R.B. 879, 880 (1971) (Member Kennedy dissenting), enf. deniedon other grounds, 455 F.2d
1088 (8th Cir. 1972) (area standards).
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Employees respecting an ambulatory or common-situs picket
line at their own employer's place of business represent the converse
of the de Cordova situation. They are protected by Section 7 because
they are assisting a labor organization and its members in a struggle
with a primary employer. By happenstance, the locus of the primary
dispute has shifted to a secondary employer's premises, but the in-
jury to the secondary employer is only incidental to the primary dis-
pute. They "know that by their actions each one of them assures
himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom
they are all then helping; and the solidarity so established is 'mutual
aid' in the most literal sense . . " . 2 It is, therefore, essentially
irrelevant whether employees encounter primary stranger pickets at
their own place of employment or on another employer's prem-
ises. 1
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B. Status of the Sympathy Strikers
The rights of a sympathy striker depend upon the rights of em-
ployees whose picket line is honored. In essence, sympathy strikers
"stand in the shoes of primary strikers for purposes of lawful disci-
pline and replacement" and must be afforded "preferential reinstate-
ment rights where such rights are granted primary strikers."'
' 23
Thus, an employee honoring a picket line established by unfair labor
practice strikers must be treated as an unfair labor practice striker,
and an employee respecting an economic strike becomes an eco-
nomic striker. Economic strikers are entitled to reinstatement to
substantially equivalent positions upon their unconditional request
until they are permanently replaced. 24 Economic strikers who un-
conditionally apply for reinstatement after their positions have been
filled by permanent replacements are entitled to reinstatement as va-
cancies arise because of the departure of the replacements or the ex-
pansion of the work force.' 25  Employees may remain on this
preferential hiring list indefinitely. 126 Unfair labor practice strikers
are entitled to reinstatement regardless of whether their jobs have
120. See, e.g., Steamfitters, Local 614 (Trumbo Welding and Fabricating Co.), 199
N.L.R.B. 1026, 1031 (1972).
121. NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-506 (2d Cir.
1942).
122. Employees have no statutory or contractual right to respect a secondary picket line.
Drivers, Salesmen Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
123. NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162, 166 (1st Cir. 1977). See also, Newspaper
Production Co. v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 821, 830 (5th Cir. 1974); Cooper Thermometer Co., 154
N.L.R.B. 502, 506-07 (1965).
124. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
125. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1368-69 (1968), enfd, 414 F.2d 99, 103-106 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
126. Brooks Research & Mfg., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 634, 636-37 (1973).
been filled, and if the work force has been reduced, they must be
placed on a preferential hiring list. 27 Employees who engage in
strikes that are "conducted in an unlawful manner of for an unlaw-
ful objective" are denied reinstatement.
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These general principles present several problems in the picket
line situation. First, the sympathetic employee must determine the
status of the person whose picket line he respects. Section 7 protects
only employees acting in concert or assisting labor organizations.
Thus, the Board has held that a single employee is not protected by
Section 7 when he respects a picket line established by government
employees.' 29 There is no "concerted" action because public em-
ployees are not "employees" within the meaning of the Act, ' 30 and a
single employee cannot act in concert with non-employees. Simi-
larly, a union representing exclusively public employees is not a "la-
bor organization" within the meaning of the Act, 13 1 and a single
employee cannot "assist" a union that has no legal status. The same
reasoning would preclude Section 7 protection for a single employee
respecting a picket line composed exclusively of supervisors, 32 agri-
cultural employees, 133 or employees covered by the Railway Labor
Act. 
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This rationale does not apply when several employees unite to
assist non-employees or a union not within the scope of the Act.
Thus, in Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., Inc. the Second
Circuit and the Board held that a labor organization and its mem-
bers' actions to support a union composed of non-employees consti-
tuted concerted activity for mutual aid or protection because the
members' actions unified the labor organization, ' 3 and their actions
might result in reciprocated support in the future by the non-em-
ployees or by the other employees.' 36 The Board has applied this
distinction in similar circumstances.
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Second, the sympathetic employee must determine whether the
underlying strike is lawful. Because a strike may be unlawful for a
127. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
128. NLRB v. Drivers Local 639 (Curtis Bros), 362 U.S. 274, 281 (1960).
129. Capital Times Co., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (1978).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
131. Id at § 152(5). National Educ. Ass'n v. Marshall, 100 L.R.R.M. 2565 (D.D.C. 1979)
(union is "labor organization" if it has members in both the public and private sectors); Hirsch
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1694, 430 F. Supp. I101 (D. Del. 1977).
132. International Organization of Masters Mates & Pilots Inc., Local 28 v. NLRB, 321
F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
133. DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 646-47 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
869 (1951).
134. IBEW v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966).
135. 130 F.2d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 1942).
136. Id at 506.
137. Compare General Electric Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 1101, 1103 (1968) with In re Panaderia
Sucesion Alonso, 87 N.L.R.B. 877 (1949).
number of reasons, 38 an employee is theoretically required to un-
dertake a great amount of detective work prior to respecting a picket
line. The District of Columbia Circuit has responded to this prob-
lem by suggesting that "employees and employers will generally be
advised by counsel and will not have to rely upon their own judg-
ment."' 39 This suggestion ignores reality, for an employee unexpect-
edly encountering a picket line will not have time to contact his
union, wait for the union to contact its counsel and await counsel's
response. Nor is it likely that the union's attorney could render an
accurate opinion based solely on the facts immediately provided by
the employee at the picket line. Moreover, delay while waiting for
counsel's opinion could constitute refusal to cross the picket line. If
the picket line ultimately proved unlawful, the employee could be
subject to discipline and could face years of litigation.
Protection of employee rights requires a more immediate test.
Prior to the Buffalo Forge decision, several courts enjoined sympa-
thetic activity while the sympathizer's union and employer arbitrated
whether a particular picket line fell within a contractual right to re-
spect a picket line.' 4° The Labor Board, on the other hand, has sug-
gested that knowledge or notice of the illegality of the strike is a
prerequisite to finding a sympathy striker's refusal to cross a picket
line unprotected.' 4 ' The Board's rationale is most reasonable when
an employee encounters a picket line away from his primary job site.
No employee should be compelled to risk his employment on his
ability to determine the protected status of the pickets when his natu-
ral inclination is to respect any picket line. While permitting an em-
ployee to respect an unlawful picket line temporarily may indirectly
encourage unlawful picketing, the unwitting sympathetic employee
should not bear the burden of this illegality. Only when he knows,
or should reasonably know, that a stranger picket line is unlawful
138. For example, a strike may breach a contractual no-strike clause, Atkinson v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); may violate §§ 8(b)(4), 8(b)(7), and 8(d), and (g) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), (7), (d) (1976); may be a wildcat strike in derogation of the bargaining
agent's authority, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50 (1975); or may be otherwise unprotected by § 7, UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949). Of course, there are numerous exceptions to
these rules. See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
139. Drivers, Salesmen Local 695 v. NLRB (Threlfall Construction Co.), 361 F.2d 547,
551 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
140. Axelrod, TheApplication ofthe Boys Markets Decision in the Federal Courts, 16 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 893, 922 nn.223-227 (1975).
141. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1550 (1954) ("Because they joined in the
unprotected strike. . . with knowledge of its planned intermittent and hit and run aspects, the
tollmen also removed themselves from the protection of the Act.") (emphasis added). In the
same decision, however, the Board also stated, "It was sufficient ... that each of the tollmen
• ..was a participant in the strike strategy; whether knowingly or unwittingly is of no signifi-
cance." Id. at 1552. This apparent contradiction may be resolved by distinguishing between
the employees' knowledge of the unlawful strike tactic and their ignorance of their own rights.
Where the majority of the strikers clearly know of their wrongful activity, the Board held, the
employer need not inquire into the knowledge of each participant.
should the sympathetic employee's conduct be deemed unprotected.
Thus, an employer contemplating the discharge of an employee for
honoring an allegedly unlawful picket line should be required to no-
tify the employee of the alleged basis of the illegality prior to engag-
ing in self help.'4 2 A higher standard of knowledge should be
presumed, however, when an employee honors a picket line at his
regular place of employment established by his own union.'43
Third, an employer whose employees respect a stranger unfair
labor practice picket line at another employer's facility must, theo-
retically, treat his employees as unfair labor practice strikers, with
preferential reinstatement rights. The preferential status accorded
unfair labor practice strikers causes some disruption to an employer
who has replaced some or all striking employees. But this disruption
is justified where the employer has committed the unfair labor prac-
tice prompting the strike and sympathetic activity. This rationale
does not apply in the stranger picketing situation, where the sympa-
thizer's employer is an innocent bystander incidentally affected by
the primary picketing. Vis-a-vis the innocent employer, the sympa-
thetic striker should be accorded status only as an economic striker.
C. Remedies
Unlawfully discharged sympathy strikers are entitled to imme-
diate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other
rights and benefits. Board law concerning the backpay remedy is in
a state of flux. Until recently the policy was clear: like discharged
strikers, a discharged sympathy striker was not entitled to backpay
during the period of the strike when he voluntarily withheld his serv-
ices."' Unlike strikers, however, a discharged sympathy striker was
not required to make an unconditional request for reinstatement.
Ordinarily, the termination of striker status is signified by an appli-
cation for reinstatement, the unlawful rejection of which begins the
142. Compare, Steelworkers v. NLRB (Dow Chemical Co.), 530 F.2d 266, 276-79 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), in which the court considered the employer's resort to
self-help rather than arbitration in overturning the discharges of employees who struck in
breach of contract. On remand a divided Board found it "unwise" to rely on the employer's
failure to seek injunctive relief. DOW Chemical Co., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 129, n. 11 (1979).
143. AT&T, 231 N.L.R.B. 556, 561 (1977). Here the Board adopted without comment a
Law Judge's Decision holding that sympathizers' "prior knowledge" was irrelevant because it
would require instantaneous informed judgments by untutored laymen. The facts, however,
constituted constructive knowledge of the unlawful underlying strike, for the strike was di-
rected in part against the union, and union officials urged the employees to cross the picket
line.
144. Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502, 508 n. 15 (1965). Backpay begins on the
day the strike ends, unless the sympathetic employee can prove he would have returned to
work during the strike. Lost earnings during the strike are not attributable to the employer's
misconduct. Union Carbide Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. 989 (1969), endin pert. part, 440 F.2d 54
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
period of backpay. Such an application, however, is not necessary to
perfect employee rights to reinstatement and backpay when the em-
ployer's conduct has made it plain that the application will be re-
jected.'45 Relying on this "futility" exception, the Board has recently
overruled its precedents and held that an unlawfully discharged
striker is entitled to backpay from the date of discharge, rather than
from the date of application for reinstatement. The Board retains its
rule that strikers are not entitled to backpay until they abandon the
strike. But "[w]hen discharged strikers withhold their services after
the date of the unlawful discharge, one cannot really be certain
whether their continuing refusal to work is voluntary, i e., a result of
the strike, or whether the reason for not making application for rein-
statement is that the employer, by discharging the employees, has
mistakenly impressed on them the futility of making such an appli-
cation."' 46 Assuming that the same rationale will apply to dis-
charged sympathy strikers, backpay should begin on the date of
discharge unless the employer can prove that the employee would
have continued the sympathetic action for the duration of the strike.
IV. Limitations on the Right to Respect a Lawful Primary Picket
Line
Few rights are absolute. The right to strike and the correlative
right to respect a lawful primary picket line are subject to several
qualifications. These limitations reflect the sanctification of collec-
tive bargaining agreements by national labor policies, the inherent
right of an employer to operate his business, and the Congressional
premise that not all employees covered by the Act have the right to
strike.
A. Waiver
A foundation of the national labor policy espoused in 1935 was
the Congressional expectation that employees freed to join unions
without fear of reprisal would ultimately execute collective bargain-
ing agreements with their employers. " The Wagner Act contained
no mechanism for the enforcement of the labor agreement, an omis-
sion Congress rectified by the enactment of Section 301 in 1947.148
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court immediately recognized that the
Wagner Act contemplated that contracts would be binding on both
145. Southern Greyhound Lines, 169 N.L.R.B. 627, 628 (1968), enfd, 426 F.2d 1299,
1303-04 (5th Cir. 1970); Nuodex Div. of Tenneco Chems., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 611, n.2 (1969).
146. Abilities and Goodwill, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (1979).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
148. id § 185. The legislative history of this section is thoroughly analyzed in Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See also, Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B.
837 (1971).
parties and that an employer did not commit an unfair labor practice
by discharging employees for striking in breach of a contractual no-
strike clause. 49 In essence, a union may waive the statutory right to
strike, or to respect a picket line, thereby subjecting employees cov-
ered by the waiver to discharge for engaging in conduct otherwise
protected by Section 7. Conversely, a union may solidify the statu-
tory right by incorporating it into its collective bargaining agree-
ments. '
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Tensions arise when the contract is silent concerning the right to
respect a picket line or when the contract expressly permits or pro-
hibits the right to respect some, but not all, picket lines. The Board
and the courts agree on the general principles applicable in such cir-
cumstances: "Where there has been no express waiver of the right to
strike, a waiver of the right. . . is not to be inferred."'' They have
also uniformly adhered to the principle that a waiver of Section 7
rights must be "clear and unmistakable."'' 52 When the contract lan-
guage does not fairly raise the possibility of an intent to waive a
statutory right, resort to collateral evidence of a waiver is inappropri-
ate. 153 On occasion, a contract has embodied language so "clear and
unmistakable" that no other evidence of intent has been required. In
other instances, the terms of an agreement, without demonstrating
unequivocally the intent to waive a statutory right, have pointed in
that direction. In such cases, the Board and the courts have been
willing to consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. 5 A
union will not be found to have waived a right guaranteed by the Act
absent cogent evidence that the subject was consciously explored and
the union has knowingly yielded that right.'55
149. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 342 and n.5 (1939). See also, NLRB v. Rock-
away News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80 (1953).
150. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co. 345 U.S. 71 (1953). A study of 400 contracts
effective in 1978 revealed that 22 percent permitted employees to observe picket lines in speci-
fied situations. Of the agreements with such clauses, 21 percent allow the observance of a
picket line only at the employee's own plant; 50 percent permit the observance at any plant;
and 29 percent permit the observance if further conditions are met, e.g., approval of the under-
lying strike. Seven percent permit the honoring of a picket line only if manned by the employ-
ees own union. 2 BNA Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts 77:6 (1978).
151. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 293 (1957) (footnote omitted). See also, Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283-84 (1956).
152. Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.), (citing NLRB v.
Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry Co., 440 F.2d 393, 399 (7th Cir. 1971)) cert. denied, 423 U.S.
925 (1975), and cases cited therein. Cf. Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing & Lifting Machine
Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89, 92 (7th Cir. 1975) (denial of injunction).
153. News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673, 677 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1968). W.L. Mead, Inc., 113
N.L.R.B. 1040 (1955).
154. See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283-84 (1956); NLRB v.
Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 79-80 (1953); Hearst Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. 1405,
1414-17 (1966), enfdsub nom., News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
155. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 971 (1964) and cases cited therein; NLRB v. Perkins Machine Co., 326 F.2d 488, 489
(1st Cir. 1964).
Problems arise in the application of these principles to the facts
of particular cases. In Rockaway News Supply Co. ,56 the first real
waiver case, the Board held that a no-strike clause did not waive the
right to respect a picket line where the entire contract was tainted by
an unlawful provision. 57 The Second Circuit did not expressly con-
sider the waiver issue, but nevertheless concluded that an employee
could not refuse to perform part of his regular duties merely because
they required crossing a picket line. 5 8 To the Supreme Court, the
case turned solely on the waiver issue. Since the contract contained
a general no-strike clause and the union had unsuccessfully sought a
clause protecting the employees' right to honor a picket line, the em-
ployer could lawfully discharge an employee respecting a picket
line.' 5 9 Moreover, an arbitration panel had previously sustained the
discharge on the basis of a contractual waiver.'60 The Court neither
discussed the need for a "clear and unambiguous" waiver nor ex-
pressly concluded that the no-strike clause was ambiguous; it merely
held that the negotiating history resolved any ambiguity in favor of
the employer. 16' The implication, however, is that a broad no-strike
clause creates enough ambiguity to warrant recourse to collateral ev-
idence.
The Board's position concerning waiver has been fairly consis-
tent: a broad no-strike clause, without more, does not waive the
right to respect a picket line.' 62 This follows from the accepted fact
of industrial life that "a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is
the quidpro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit griev-
ance disputes to the process of arbitration."'' 63 In other words, the
courts presume that a union waives the right to strike only over dis-
putes cognizable under the grievance procedure. Conversely, the
156. Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951), enf denied, 197 F.2d Ill (2d
Cir. 1952), aft'd, 345 U.S. 71 (1953). The year before, the Board had held that a contract with
no no-strike clause did not waive the right to respect a picket line. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 88
N.L.R.B. 1171, 1174-75 (1950), enf denied on other grounds, 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951).
157. Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336, 337 (1951).
158. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1952).
159. 345 U.S. at 80-81. The Court noted that the contract contained a savings and separa-
bility clause, and that both parties had considered the entire contract valid prior to the incident
in question. Id at 78-79.
160. Id at 74, n.3, and 80.
161. Id at 79-80.
162. Operating Engineers, Local 18 (Davis-McKee), 238 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1978) and cases
cited therein. In the Board's view,
a waiver of the right to strike for the purpose of coercing an employer into granting
demands with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment is not equivalent to a requirement that employees cross stranger picket lines.
We will not infer a waiver of the protected right to engage in sympathy strikes solely
from an agreement to refrain from all "stoppages of work." Rather, we shall require
that the parties at the very least have discussed the question and, preferably, have
expressly embodied in their agreement their intent to extend a strike ban to sympathy
strikes.
163. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
right to engage in sympathetic activity is presumptively excluded
from the scope of a general no-strike clause when there is no under-
lying grievance and the sympathy strike itself creates the only dis-
pute between the parties. 6 On the other hand, a union may
expressly waive the right to strike even over matters that cannot be
submitted under the grievance procedure.
165
A union negotiating its first contract with an employer would be
wise, therefore, to propose a no-strike clause coextensive with the
grievance-arbitration system and to propose no clause concerning
the right to respect a picket line. If the latter issue is never raised,
there can be no waiver, for "it is the [employer who] must obtain
contractual language to limit such right in clear and unmistakable
terms."16 6 The union has no obligation to protect the right contrac-
tually, and can only harm its members by an unsuccessful attempt.
Once the issue is raised, the existence of a waiver depends upon
the facts of each case. When the employer unsuccessfully proposed a
clause prohibiting sympathy strikes, a broad no-strike clause is not a
waiver. 167  Conversely, when the union unsuccessfully sought a
clause providing that respct for a picket line shall neither violate the
contract nor constitute cause for discharge, and when its president
indicated that sympathetic action would violate the contract, the
Board has permitted the discharge of sympathy strikers. 68 When
the union obtains the contractual right to respect certain types of
picket lines, the Board will find no express or implied waiver of the
right to honor picket lines not mentioned in the provision, even if the
union unsuccessfully sought broader protection. 69 When collateral
evidence is permitted, it should be contemporaneous with the negoti-
ation of the agreement and should not consist of union conduct dur-
ing a strike. 7 °
164. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 744-46 (1974), enfd, 511 F.2d 284, 288
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975); Kellogg Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 948, 949 (1971), enfd,
457 F.2d 519, 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972); Hearst Corp., 161 N.L.R.B.
1405, 1413-15 (1966), affd sub nom., News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673, 678 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
165. See, e.g., Alliance Mfg. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 697, 700 (1972).
166. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 746 n.20 (1974), enfd, 511 F.2d 284
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
167. Id at 745.
168. Hearst Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. 1405, 1413-15 (1966), a#d, 393 F.2d 673, 678 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
169. Keller-Crescent Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 685, 687-89 (1975), enf. denied on other grounds,
538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976). The Board reasoned that an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a
contractual restatement of statutory rights does not constitute a waiver where the employer's
rejection of the union proposal was not phrased as a restriction of statutory rights. A union
does not waive a statutory right because it unsuccessfully tries to have the right expressly
recognized in a bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325
F.2d 746, 750-51 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964). Leland-Gifford Co., 95
N.L.R.B. 1306, 1310 (1951), en/din pert. part, 200 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1952).
170. Compare Kellogg Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 948, 949 (1971) with Hearst Corp., 161 N.L.R.B.
1405, 1416 (1966).
Beyond these principles of negotiation tactics, the Board and the
courts carefully consider the precise language discussed by the par-
ties, and the placement of a picket line clause within the framework
of the entire agreement. For example, a proposal that "It shall not
be a violation of this agreement" if employees engage in a sympathy
strike "strongly indicates" the union's understanding that a sympa-
thy strike would violate the contract absent that clause. 7 ' On the
other hand, an unsuccessful proposal that "no employee shall be re-
quired to cross an authorized, primary picket line" does not warrant
the inference that absent the clause the contract would prohibit em-
ployees from honoring a picket line.'7 2 If obtained, such a clause not
only commits the employer not to require employees to cross a pick-
et line, but it also waives the employer's statutory right to replace
employees for such conduct. Similarly, there is a significant distinc-
tion between a clause stating that a union shall not cause a sympathy
strike and one providing that no employee shall participate in a work
stoppage. 73 The Board and courts disagree whether a clause
prohibiting the discharge of a sympathy striker waives protection
from lesser discipline.' 74 Thus, careful draftsmanship is essential to
the preservation or waiver of Section 7 rights.
Whether or not an employee may respect a picket line in a par-
ticular situation is presumptively an arbitrable question. Prior to
Buffalo Forge, several courts of appeals enjoined sympathetic activ-
ity while the parties arbitrated whether the refusal to cross a picket
line and resulting work stoppage violated agreements containing
limited protection of rights clauses. 175 In NLRB v. Keller-Crescent
Co. 176 the Seventh Circuit applied this discredited rationale in Sec-
tion 7 cases, holding that the decisive question was whether the
union "had a duty to arbitrate its dispute over the application and
construction of the picket line clause before honoring the. . . picket
line by engaging in work stoppage." Answering affirmatively with-
out reaching the waiver issue, the court reasoned that Buffalo Forge
did not consider contractual obligations and unfair labor practices.
It followed, reasoned the court, that the scope of a picket line clause
is arbitrable and that the Board's asserted authority to interpret the
clause is limited, for the Board cannot "pre-empt" the arbitrator. 1
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171. Keller-Crescent Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 685, 692 (1975), enf. denied on other grounds, 538
F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976).
172. 217 N.L.R.B. at 691-92.
173. Newspaper Production Co. v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 821, 830 (5th Cir. 1974).
174. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 879, 883, (1971), enf. denied, 455 F.2d
1088, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972).
175. See note 140 supra.
176. 538 F.2d 1291, 1295 (7th Cir. 1976).
177. Id at 1296-1300.
The court distinguished its prior decisions in Gary-Hobart'78 and
Hyster179 on the grounds that neither contained a picket line clause
and both contained narrower definitions of a grievance. °8 0 In es-
sence, the court held, employees cannot be encouraged to act upon
their own interpretation of unclear contract rights.' 8' Employees
have an absolute obligation to arbitrate once the employer notifies
their union of its interpretation of the contract, and continued sym-
pathetic activity is unprotected prior to the actual arbitration.
Keller-Crescent misconstrues several basic propositions of labor
law. First, the Board's assertion of jurisdiction is plainly authorized
by the Act. Section 10 authorizes the Board to act whenever a
charge is filed,' 82 despite the existence of any contractual method of
dispute resolution. 83 The Supreme Court has consistently held that
the availability of arbitration does not deprive the Board of the
power to resolve contractual issues and that when the Board and an
arbitrator disagree, the Board's decision prevails.' 4 Thus, the Sev-
enth Circuit's Keller-Crescent decision ignores the Board's statutory
duty to consider whether the contract constitutes a waiver of a statu-
tory right. In this situation, the Board does not function as an arbi-
tration panel merely interpreting a contract. Rather, it interprets a
contract only as necessary to adjudicate an unfair labor practice
complaint. 85 In essence, the Seventh Circuit's reliance upon Buffalo
Forge for the proposition that the ensuing arbitration might be
"heavily influenced or wholly pre-empted" by the Board's decision
indicated a crucial misunderstanding about the relative roles of the
Board, the courts and arbitrators: courts have limited authority to
review arbitration awards,' 86 while the Board has discretion to defer
to the arbitration process.'
87
Second, the court's reasoning is circular. The Board has previ-
ously rejected the argument that a union must first arbitrate, stating,
"the very assertion that [the union] was obligated to await arbitration
before action is but artful rephrasing of the claim that they had sur-
178. Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
925 (1975).
179. Hyster Co. v. Employees Ass'n of Kewanee, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 910 (1976). Compare Inland Steel Co. v. UMW Local 1545, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir.
1974).
180. NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co., 538 F.2d 1291, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1976).
181. Id at 1300.
182. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
183. Id at § 160(a).
184. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421,425-430 (1967); NLRB v. Acme Indus.
Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
185. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360-62 (1969).
186. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 363 U.S. 574, 580-83 (1960); Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
187. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
rendered all right to do so."' 88 No other court has ever construed a
broad arbitration provision as a clear and unmistakable waiver of
the right to strike when there is no underlying grievance, and at the
same time, ensured that the parties will never arbitrate their dispute.
In Inland Steel, upon which Keller- Crescent heavily relies, the court
held that the injunction implicitly requires the parties to arbitrate the
employees' right to respect a picket line. 189 Yet Keller-Crescent itself
pre-empts arbitration by determining that the employees had waived
their right to take action before arbitrating; it ignores the very real
possibility that the employees may have been contractually justified
in honoring the picket line.' 9° The Keller-Crescent rationale no
longer justifies the issuance of an injunction, which merely delayed
the exercise of employee rights until their vindication in arbitration,
and it is clearly erroneous when applied to sustain a discharge for
arguably protected conduct.
Last, Keller-Crescent ignores a primary reality of daily labor re-
lations: parties routinely act upon unclear contractual rights prior to
submitting the issue to arbitration. When an employer discharges an
employee, allegedly for just cause, only later, perhaps weeks or
months later, do the parties arbitrate the existence of just cause.
Similarly, an employer may unilaterally change the nature of its
business, arguably in violation of his labor agreement; but in only
the rarest of circumstances may a union obtain an injunction requir-
ing arbitration before the effectuation of the change.' 9 ' If the em-
ployer wins the ensuing arbitration, the award essentially establishes
that a breach of contract never occurred, and retroactively approves
the employer's conduct. Conversely, if the employer loses the even-
tual arbitration, its actions were wrong ab initio and it must restore
the status quo ante. A broad arbitration clause requires neither an
employer nor a union to submit potentially controversial decisions to
arbitration before taking action. Yet Keller-Crescent imposes just
this prior restraint upon employees and their union, while leaving an
employer free to gamble that its contractual interpretations will
eventually prove accurate.
A broad no-strike clause, or even a clause expressly waiving the
right to respect a picket line, does not render unprotected a refusal to
cross a picket line in all situations. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
188. Hearst Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. 1405, 1414 (1966), aft'd, 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
189. Inland Steel Co. v. UMW, Local 1545, 505 F.2d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 1974).
190. Compare NLRB v. Bumup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964), in which the Court
held improper a discharge based upon the mistaken belief than an employee had been guilty of
alleged misconduct. Where the employee was not actually guilty of misconduct, the discharge
violated § 8(a)(I) of the Act.
191. (Compare Teamsters, Local 71 v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1266 (1979) with Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1974).
NLRB,'9 2 the Supreme Court held that a union's contractual no-
strike pledge waives employees' rights to strike for economic bene-
fits, but did not waive their rights to strike solely against their em-
ployer's unfair labor practices when the contract, read as a whole,
deals only with the economic relationship between the parties. At
first the Board interpreted Mastro Plastics as leaving unprotected an
unfair labor practice strike over an arbitrable dispute unless the un-
fair labor practice was "'destructive of the foundation upon which
collective bargaining must rest' " and referred the parties to arbitra-
tion. 93 Applying these principles, an employee could honor a picket
line despite a broad waiver clause only when the pickets were fellow
employees protesting unfair labor practices that effectively repudiate
the contract or withdraw recognition from a certified union. Later
cases suggest that any refusal to bargain violation, except, perhaps, a
unilateral change, will justify a strike and sympathetic action despite
a broad no-strike clause.
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192. 350 U.S. 270, 283 (1956).
193. Arlan's Dept. Store, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 802, 807-808 (1961), quoting Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281 (1956). See, Jones & McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 97,
104-05 (7th Cir. 1971), enf°g, 183 N.L.R.B. 82 (1970). Cf. Communications Workers (Western
Electric), 204 N.L.R.B. 782, 784 (1973).
194. First, in Laconia Shoe Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 573 n.l, 577-78 (1974), the Board held that a
strike protesting the unlawful extension of recognition to a minority union justified an em-
ployee in another unit to respect the picket line of fellow employees directly affected by the
violation. Chairman Miller and Member Kennedy, who had dissented in Gary-Hobart, agreed
that the waiver did not apply. Later, in Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 341, 342 n.6
(1976), the Board found that an unlawful discharge and an unlawful refusal to accord recogni-
tion constituted "such serious matters that a strike in protest of or in support against such
practices should be, and is, protected" despite a broad no-strike clause and an express protec-
tion of the right to respect picket lines only in circumstances that, arguably, were not satisfied.
Member Walther concurred on the limited ground that no-strike clause applied only when
grievances were pending, but questioned reliance upon Mastro Plastics when unfair labor
practices at one location are asserted to "abrogate a no-strike provision in a collective bargain-
ing agreement with another labor organization at another location." Id. at 343. Of course,
both unions were affiliated with the same international union and the same contract applied at
all locations of the employer. Compare Brown & Root, Inc. 99 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1952) with A.O.
Smith, Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 339 (1961), modfed, 137 N.L.R.B. 361 (1962), enf. denied on other
grounds, 343 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1965) and notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra. Finally,
in C.K. Smith and Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1061, 1072-73 (1977), enf'd, 569 F.2d 162, 167 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1978), the Board and court agreed that unlawful interroga-
tions, direct bargaining with employees and the withdrawal of recognition constitute suffi-
ciently severe violations to waive an otherwise applicable no-strike clause in a contract
covering employees in a separate unit at a separate, but affiliated, corporation. Compare
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 569 n.1 (1972), in which the Board deferred a unilat-
eral change complaint to arbitration after noting that the Fifth Circuit had already enjoined
the union's strike and directed the parties to arbitrate; Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Commu-
nications Workers, 324 F. Supp. 830, 833 (S.D. Tex. 197 1), rev'd., 454 F.2d 1333, 1337 (5th Cir.
1971), on remand, 343 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 (1972). In another case, the Board, With Member
Fanning dissenting, held that a unilateral change in the work schedule was not a "serious"
unfair labor pactice abrogating the no-strike clause. On petition for review, the court ques-
tioned this strict construction of Mastro Plastics and refused to sustain the discharges because
of the employer's post strike conduct. Dow Chemical Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 333 (1974), remanded
in pertinent part sub. nom., Steelworkers v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 266, 272-79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 834 (1976). On remand, a divided Board adhered to Arlan's, but concluded that the
unfair labor practice involved were "serious." 244 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (1979).
This exception should not apply when an employee on assign-
ment away from his employer's premises encounters stranger pickets




In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. the Supreme Court
invoked the principle that an employer guilty of no other unfair la-
bor practices may exert reasonable economic counter pressure by re-
placing striking employees to protect and continue its business, even
though the strikers were engaged in protected activity. 19 6 In Redwing
Carriers the Board expressly applied this principle to the replace-
ment or discharge of sympathy strikers:
[W]here it is clear from the record that the employer acted only to
preserve efficient operation of his business, and terminated the
services of the employees only so it could immediately or within a
short period thereafter replace them with others willing to perform
the scheduled work, we can see no reason for reaching different
results solely on the basis of the precise words, i.e., replacement or
discharge, used by the employer, or the chronological order in
which the employer terminated and replaced the employees in
question. '97
The Board then held that the discharge of a driver for honoring a
stranger picket line at a customer's plant did not violate the Act
when the drivers were assigned regular routes, and the employer im-
mediately assigned another driver to the route vacated by the sympa-
thy striker and hired an additional driver, all absent any evidence of
animus. 98 Several years later, in Overnite Transportation Co. ,99 the
Board announced a principled restriction of the Redwing rationale,
making it more difficult for an employer to invoke the business ne-
cessity defense successfully:
Recognizing the right of an employer to run his business despite
this protected activity, the Board has held that an employer does
not violate the Act in terminating such employees if the employer
acts "only to preserve efficient operation of his business, and...
only so [that he] could immediately or within a short period there-
after replace them with others willing to perform the scheduled
work . . . ." At the same time, however, it is the Board's view
that if the protected right of employees is to have any meaning at
all, then the employer who would justify a discharge on the basis
195. See text following note 143 supra.
196. 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
197. 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547 (1962), affd, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 905 (1964) (footnote omitted).
198. Id at 1548.
199. 154 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1274 (1965), enfdper curiam, 364 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(Overnite I) citing Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547 (1962) (emphasis in origi-
nal). The business necessity balancing test is analyzed at length in Haggard, supra, note 9, at
71-83.
of an overriding employer interest must present more than a mere
showing that someone else may have to do the work. That fact is
inherent in every situation where employees fail to perform a por-
tion of their assigned tasks by respecting a picket line. To accept it
alone as conclusive proof that their services were terminated solely
to preserve efficient operation of the employer's business would be
to render illusory any finding that the employees engaged in pro-
tected concerted activity. It would leave the refusal to cross a
picket line without any protection at all. Clearly, what is required
is the balancing of two opposing rights, and it is only when the
employer's business need to replace the employees is such as
clearly to outweight the employees' right to engage in protected
activity that an invasion of the statutory right is justified.2 °°
With Overnite I, the Board began to develop a rather flexible set of
criteria for use in the balancing test.
1. Actual replacement. -Logically, there can be no business
necessity for the discharge of a sympathy striker if the employer has
made no effort to fill the vacancy with another employee willing to
perform the work. If an employer can reschedule its work force
without undue inconvenience, the balancing of interests weighs
heavily on the side of the sympathy striker. The Board has never
sustained a discharge unless the employer has promptly hired
replacements, 20 1 and two of the three cases in which a court rejected
a Board reinstatement order involved the replacement of the dis-
charged sympathy strikers.20 2 In other cases, the Board has found a
discharge illegal despite replacement when other factors indicated
that business necessity was a pretext or did not justify a discharge.20 3
The Board has consistently emphasized the significance of the failure




200. 154 N.L.R.B. at 1247.
201. The Board has upheld discharges in five cases: Overnite Transportation Co., 212
N.L.R.B. 515 (1974) (Overnite IV); Overnite Transportation Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 691 (1974)
(Overnite III); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967); Redwing Carriers, Inc.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), a'd, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905
(1964); Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953). Each involved the replacement of sympathy
strikers.
202. Employees were replaced in NLRB v. L.G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964),
and NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953). Everist technically involved a
refusal to reinstate before permanent replacement, not the legality of an initial discharge; and
Rockaway News was a contract construction case, not involving a statutory right. In NLRB v.
William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1, 5 (Ist Cir. 1978), the court sustained the discharge absent
replacement because the driver had demonstrated "poor judgment" by specifically accepting a
charter trip to a picketed site but refusing to cross the picket line upon his arrival, thereby
requiring a police escort to protect his passengers. Where the conduct was protected, however,
the employee's wisdom should be irrelevant (Cf. Alto Plastics Mfg. Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 850,
851-52 (1962)), and the court apparently created an exception for the endangerment of passen-
gers that should not apply to property, which can safely be stored in a trailer at the picket site.
203. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967); Overnite Transp. Co., 164
N.L.R.B. 72 (1967) (Overnite II); Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503 (1971).
204. Swain & Morris Constr. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1065 (1967), enfd431 F.2d 861, 863
(9th Cir. 1970). There, the employer could not find skilled replacements. A similar result
should apply when replacements are available, but the employer does not hire them.
and recently concluded that replacement was "essential."2 5 Thus,
the permanent replacement of a discharged sympathy striker is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a valid discharge.
2. Balance of Inconvenience. -The Overnite I balancing test
requires analysis of the inconvenience to the employer caused by the
refusal to cross a picket line. If the employer can reschedule the
workforce with minor inconvenience, a discharge is improper. For
example, in Redwing, each driver had a regularly assigned route and
the employer could not reassign another driver to make a missed
pickup or delivery without disrupting at least two routes. In Overnite
I, on the other hand, drivers were dispatched by radio and had no
assigned routes. A driver honoring a picket line could report his
conduct to the dispatcher, who could immediately reassign another
driver with only minimum inconvenience to the employer.
2 °6
The regular nature of the work, however, is not controling, for a
driver with no "regular assignment" may nevertheless regularly
spend a disproportionate amount of time with one customer. In
Overnite III, the employer successfully raised the business necessity
defense when several factors outweighed the ease of radio dispatch.
First, the struck employer was a major customer and work there con-
sumed a major portion of the workday for several employees.20 7
Second, the work was recurring and the driver had refused to do a
major portion of his normal job, so performance by substitutes
would be difficult without major disruption.20 8 Third, there was no
other work the honoror could perform. 20 9 Last, because no other
driver was available, the employer discharged the honoror and re-
placed him immediately.210 Other Board decisions consider the sig-
205. Overnite IV, 212 N.L.R.B. 515, 523 (1974).
206. Overnite I, 154 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1275 (1965), enfdper curiam, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir.
1966). See also Smith Transit, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1084 (1969), enfdper curiam, 429 F.2d
204 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Alamo Express, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 315, 326 (1968), end, 430 F.2d 1032
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); Vangas, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 960, 962 (1967).
207. Overnite III, 209 N.L.R.B. 691, 693 (1974). The driver was assigned runs to this
customer two or three times a week and each run required four or five hours of work. See also
Overnite IV, 212 N.L.R.B. 515, 518, 519 (1974).
208. Overnite 11, 209 N.L.R.B. 691, 692 (1974). See also Swain & Morris Constr. Co., 168
N.L.R.B. 1064, 1065 n.4 (1967), enf'd, 431 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1970). In other cases, the Board
has distinguished between a refusal to cross a picket line at an exclusive customer and one of
many customers. Braswell Motor Feight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1971); Smiths Transit,
Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1084 (1969).
209. Overnite II1, 209 N.L.R.B. 691, 692 (1974). Similarly, in Swain & Morris Construction
Co., the Court noted that "other assignments were available which would not have required
the workers to cross picket lines and which would not put the employer in the position of
keeping men on the payroll for whom there was no work." 431 F.2d 861 863 (9th Cir. 1970).
210. Overnite III, 209 N.L.R.B. 691, 692 (1974). The Board has considered the availabil-
ity of supervisors to replace sympathy strikers. In Smith Transit, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1084
(1969), the Board noted that by using a supervisor the employer was not dependent upon using
other employees, who might not be willing to cross the line. Cf. Braswell Motor Freight Line,
189 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1971). In constrast, in Thurston Motor Lines, 166 N.L.R.B. 862, 866
(1967), the Board held that the emergency use of supervisors need not be repeated indefinitely.
nificance or urgency of the work the honoror refuses to perform.21'
When objective factors of urgency or relative importance are un-
available, the Board has considered whether the employer ever told
the employee that the work was urgent.212
3. Insubordination. -The discharge of an employee for refus-
ing a direct order to cross a picket line constitutes persuasive evi-
dence that the employer has failed the business necessity test. It
shows "little or no regard for . . . countervailing employee
rights." '2 13 But a specific policy requiring employees to cross a picket
line is not dispositive. Despite the existence of an arguably over-
broad rule, an employer may, nevertheless, demonstrate an adequate
business justification for the discharge.214
4. Animus.-Many picket line cases are litigated solely as al-
leged violations of Section 8(a)(3), a distinction with no effect upon
the remedy.2" 5 Animus may be determinative, however, when the
Board or court is unwilling to find the sympathetic activity protected
or when the business necessity defense is compelling. Thus, in
Overnite I, the court did not consider whether the refusal to cross a
stranger picket line was itself protected. Nevertheless, the court held
that anti-union animus colored the discharge and enforced the
Board's order solely on the Section 8(a)(3) rationale.2"6
5. Replacement vs. Discharge. -Almost immediately after Red-
wing, the Board held that a Redwing discharge was not a "discharge
for cause," but was merely a permissible method of maintaining a
going business. It followed, therefore, that when an employer hired
only a series of temporary replacements, but no permanent replace-
ments, the sympathy striker was entitled to reinstatement upon his
unconditional request.2"7 Criticism of the Board's distinction
originated in Rockaway News, in which the Supreme Court stated
Thurston, however, involved a regularly assigned route to a recurring customer, while Smith
Transit involved radio dispatch and a non-recurring customer.
211. See, e.g., Swain & Morris Constr. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1065 (1967), enfd, 431
F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1970); N.L.R.B. v. L.G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312, 315 (8th Cir. 1964);
Overnite I, 154 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1275 n.7 (1965), enfdpercuriam,'364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
212. Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503, 505 (1971).
213. Overnite I, 154 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1275 (1965), enfdper curiam, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Overnite IV, 212 N.L.R.B. 515, 516 (1974); Alamo Express, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 315, 326
(1968) enf'd430 F.2d 1032, (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); Overnite II, 164
N.L.R.B. 72, 74 (1971).
214. Overnite III, 209 N.L.R.B. 691, 695 (1974).
215. See, e.g., Difco Laboratories, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 2142, 2149 n.1 (1968), enfdper
curiam, 427 F.2d 170 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970).
216. 364 F.2d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also, G&P Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 92
L.R.R.M. 3652, 3656 (4th Cir. 1976).
217. L.G. Everist, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 193, 195 (1963), enf. denied in pert. part, 334 F.2d
312, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1964).
that there was no difference from the employee's viewpoint.2" 8 This
attack is easily deflected. Although the Board had argued that Rock-
away News was a picket line situation, the Court expressly limited its
ruling to an unlawful strike situation, when employees are wholly
unprotected by Section 7.2t9 Perhaps more importantly, develop-
ments in the Mackay doctrine have given replaced economic strikers
signficant new rights, i e., placement on a preferential hiring list,
with an enforceable right to reinstatement whenever vacancies
arise.22° Thus, to employers and employees alike there is a substan-
tial and substantive distinction between replacement and discharge,
a distinction the Board has recently reemphasized in Torrington Con-
struction Co., Inc. 221
6. Stranger Pickets vs. Fellow Employees. -The "balancing of
interests" standard applies when an employee refuses "to perform
that part of his regular daily duties which involve his crossing the
picket line of another union than his own at anotherplant than that of
his employer. 22 2 An employee has a more direct and substantial
interest in a labor dispute involving fellow employees than he has in
a stranger picketing situation. Conversely, an employer's interest in
preserving the efficient operation of its business is stronger when an
employee refuses to perform part of his regular duties than when the
employee is unwilling to act as a strikebreaker but is perfectly will-
ing to perform his normal assignment. Thus, the balancing test nor-
mally applies only in the stranger picketing context. Employees who
refuse to cross picket lines established by fellow employees at their
employer's premises should be treated as strikers; that is, placed on
layoff status for the duration of the strike, and recalled immediately
upon the cessation of the strike.223
In sum, an employer wishing to assert his economic right to re-
place strikers would be well-advised to place them on layoff status,
218. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953).
219. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have expressly accepted this distinction. NLRB v.
Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971); NLRB
v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1970).
220. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), end, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). See also notes 125-126 and accompanying text supra.
221. 235 N.L.R.B. No. 211 (1978) at 5. The Board did not always interpret this distinction
so strictly. In Overnite III the law judge found a violation of the Laidlaw rationale, but the
Board dismissed without commenting on the Laidlaw issue. But see Newbery Energy Corp.,
227 N.L.R.B. 436, 437 (1976); M/G Transport Services, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 324, 326 (1973).
222. Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502, 505 (1965) (emphasis in original), citing
NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 197 F.2d 11, 113 (2d Cir. 1952), a'don other
grounds, 345 U.S. 71 (1953). Lenkurt Electric Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 259, 262 (1969).
223. General Electric Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 372, 374 (1971). The Board distinguished
Cooper, in which the employee had been discharged, and Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 189
N.L.R.B. 879, 882 (1971), enf. denied, 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972), in which the length of the
suspension was unrelated to the duration of the strike. Cf. Pinaud, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 235
(1943).
subject to recall when the picketing ends and as vacancies arise.
This action would inconvenience the employer no more than a dis-
charge, but would have the salutory effect of avoiding the appear-
ance of punitive or otherwise unfair conduct and the resulting costly
litigation.
C Fear
Since its initial Redwing decision, the Board has consistently
held that an employee refusing to cross a picket line engaged in pro-
tected activity does not lose the protection of Section 7 if that objec-
tively protected conduct is motivated by fear.224 An employee,
especially one in a nonorganized company, may refuse to cross a
picket line out of principle, but, fearing reprisal for pro-union activ-
ity, tell his employer he was afraid to cross the picket line. In some
instances an employee may indicate that a combination of fear and
sympathy prompted his actions. According to the Fourth Circuit,
however, the proffering of "an excuse which [the employee] hoped
would be palatable" to the employer"' is cause for discharge, for it
removes the protection of Section 7: "One who refuses to cross a
picket line by reason of physical fear does not act on principle. He
makes no common cause, and contributes nothing to mutual aid or
protection in the collective bargaining process." '226 This rationale
has plausable surface validity. An employer must be permitted to
rely on the facts available at the time, and an employee's later state-
ments should not be relevant unless the employer is charged with
constructive notice that the employee was actually a union adher-
ent. 2 2 7 It may also be argued that condoning fear-based refusals to
cross picket lines will only promote picket line violence, since unions
compel through fear what they cannot induce through principle, and
that such a rule is contrary to national labor policy. Upon analysis,
however, the Fourth Circuit's position has less validity. An em-
ployee should not be compelled to choose between the risk of actual
violence or the risk of .discharge. If the national labor policy must
discourage violence, and it should, the remedy is to punish violent
224. Overnite IV, 212 N.L.R.B. 515, 516 n.6(1974); Congoleum Indus., Inc., 197 N.L.R.B.
534, 547 (1972). These cases reject the Fourth Circuit's position. See note 226 infra. Accord,
Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502, 504 (1965); Texas Foundries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B.
1642, 1683 (1952), enf. deniedoon other grounds, 211 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1954).
225. Lenkurt Electric Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 259, 261 (1969).
226. NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826
(1971). See also NLRB v. G&P Trucking Co., 92 L.R.R.M. 3652, 3655 (4th Cir. 1976); Kellogg
Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 523 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972). Compare NLRB
v. Montag Bros, 140 F.2d 730, 731 (5th Cir. 1944); In re Clausen 89 N.L.R.B. 989, 1010-12
(1950), end, 188 F.2d 439, 442, 443 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951).
227. The court did find such constructive notice when an employee expressed a mixed
motive and the employer knew he was actively attempting to organize the employer and was
refusing to perform struck work at an affiliated company. Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. v. NLRB,
441 F.2d 499, 502 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971).
pickets and their union, not an innocent employee. In this regard the
Board has discounted fear-based excuses where no actual violence
occured.228 More importantly, the Board's reluctance to consider
subjective motivations is supported by the Supreme Court's rejection
of "any rule that requires a probe of an employee's subjective moti-
vations as involving an endless and unreliable inquiry. ' 229  When
the employee raises the issue of fear in discussions with the em-
ployer, his intended exculpatory remarks should not insure his dis-
charge unless the employer can demonstrate the absence of a
combination with a protected motivation.
When the picket line is accompanied by objective evidence of
violence, another factor must be considered. Section 502 of the Act
provides that "the quitting of labor by an employee . . . in good
faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the
place of employment. . . [shall not] be deemed a strike under this
chapter. ' 231 In the first Redwing decision, the Board considered this
provision and found that no abnormally dangerous conditions ex-
isted, even though drivers had been threatened with violence and
shoved, and one had been kicked. The Board concluded that "some
disorder is not unusual in any extensive strike."23' Subsequently,
however, the Board has approved a much more lenient approach to
the definition of "abnormally dangerous condition, ' 232 and the situa-
tion in Redwing would probably fall within the protection of Section
502. While the statute does not state that a protest against abnor-
mally dangerous conditions is protected, the courts have so con-
strued it. 2 33  Thus, in the picket line situation the existence of
objective evidence of violence or the potential for violence should
justify a collective or individual refusal to cross a picket line.
228. Lenkurt Electric Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 259, 260-61 (1969); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc.,
166 N.L.R.B. 862, 865 (1967).
229. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969). See also Gateway Coal Co.
v. Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 386 (1974).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976). It is clear that a good faith belief that abnormally dangerous
conditions exist is insufficient under this section. Rather, the belief must be supported by
"ascertainable objective evidence." Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 386
(1974).
231. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1211 (1961), modifed, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545
(1962), enfd sub nom., Teamsters, Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964). The reviewing court noted that the second Board decision did not
find in haec verba that no abnormally dangerous conditions existed. Compare Fredrickson
Motor Express Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 557, 567 (1972) (the employee "made every reasonable
effort to discharge his cargo at the Bell plant but was thwarted by Bell's pickets who threatened
[him] with bodily harm, and by his concern that [the employer's] equipment might be dam-
aged").
232. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 542, 549-550 (1976); Roadway Express,
Inc. 217 N.L.R.B. 278, 280 (1975), enfd, 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976).
233. Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 432, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1974) on remand, 217 N.L.R.B.
278, 279-80 (1975), enfd, 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 492, 494-95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 833 and 841 (1964); NLRB v.
Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
D. Public Policy
In rare instances, federal statutes remove the protection pro-
vided by Section 7 of the right to honor a picket line. The Supreme
Court has instructed the Board to accommodate the protection of
Section 7 with other statutory schemes.234 Thus, statutes establishing
criminal penalties for mutiny prohibit a strike by seamen even while
the ship is in port.235 The same rationale should apply when seamen
refuse to load or unload cargo because of the presence of lawful
pickets. Similarly, postal service employees enjoy the protection of
the Act "to the extent not inconsistent with provisions of Title 39 of
the United States Code. '236 Thus postal employees, as quasi-federal
employees, are prohibited from striking, and respecting a picket line
therefore constitues unprotected activity.237
It is highly doubtful that other Congressional strictures exist.
For example, while the Government can obtain an injunction
against a strike imperiling the national health and safety,238 a trans-
portation employee so enjoined could nevertheless respect a stranger
picket line. Isolated instances of sympathetic activity cannot, by any
stretch of the imagination, imperil the national economy, and no
court could reasonably hold in contempt a union whose members
respected picket lines absent a substantial impact on the economy.
Similarly, law judges have suggested that the national transpor-
tation policy requires the shipment of goods across picket lines.239
Numerous commentators have discussed the issue without reaching
any firm conclusions.240 Rail, air, and water carriers are required by
statute to furnish transportation upon a shipper's reasonable request;
motor carriers have no such specific duty.24' Motor carriers, whose
employees are covered by the Act and are most likely to encounter
picket lines at pickup and delivery points, have no clear guidelines.
234. Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
235. Id at 33, 40-41.
236. 39 U.S.C. § 1209(a) (1970). Congress previously declared that postal employees
could not strike. Id at § 410(b)(1)(2), incorporating 5 U.S.C. § 3333(a) (Supp. V 1964) and 18
U.S.C. § 1918 (Supp. V 1964). Section 3333(a) requires a federal employee to execute an affi-
davit promising not to strike. Section 1918 provides for fines up to $1,000 and/or jail terms of
up to a year for a federal employee who engages in a strike.
237. United States Postal Service, Advice Memo, 99 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1978).
238. 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1976).
239. Thurston Motor Lines, 166 N.L.R.B. 862, 864, 866 n.27 (1967); Redwing Carriers,
Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1216 (1961), modoed, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enfd sub nom.,
Teamster Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
Perhaps by coincidence, the Board upheld discharges in each case. Compare Overnite IV, 212
N.L.R.B. 515, 522 (1974) wherein the law judge held that a shipper's threat of "possible action
through their lawyers" did not establish an "overriding employer interest" justifying the dis-
charge of five sympathy strikers.
240. See, e.g., Elbert & Rebman, Common Carriers and Picket Lines, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q.
232; Marshall, Carrier Service and the Picket Line- A Dilemma, 13 LAB. L.J. 301 (1962);
Scurlock, Carriers and the Duty to Cross Picket Lines, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 298 (1961).
241. Compare 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(4), 1374 and 906 (1970) with 49 U.S.C. § 316(b)-(d) (1970).
On the same set of facts-a peaceful strike and picketing by employ-
ees of a shipper honored by employees of a common carrier-the
Interstate Commerce Commission and a federal district court
reached drastically different conclusions. The Commission ruled
that the Common carriers did not breach their statutory duty, for
they may refuse to receive and transport cargo when impossible or
impractical because of circumstances beyond their control. When
carriers do not contribute to the instigation or maintenance of the
strike, they are not liable for damages.242 Ten years later, a district
court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages to the ship-
per, reasoning that carriers have an absolute duty to receive goods,
which duty cannot be abrogated because of the "illegal acts of un-
ions or labor leaders. ' 243 The court believed that carriers could not
rely upon their employees' rights to respect a picket line to evade a
statutory duty. Fortunately, most courts adopt the Commission's
view that picket line misconduct can create impracticable conditions
excusing a carrier from its duty to provide service. 2 " Carriers can
eliminate much of the risk of potential damage liability by incorpo-
rating this standard of impracticability in their tariffs.245 Thus, a
carrier may avoid civil liability if its employees fear to cross a picket
line, but not if they respect a picket line out of principle. This con-
tradiction is magnified if, as the Fourth Circuit rules, employees act-
ing out of fear are not protected and are subject to discharge; when
the employer has greater control over its employees, it has less re-
sponsibility under the Motor Carriers Act. To enhance the confu-
sion, the Supreme Court has, on four occasions, overturned state
court injunctions directing employees of common carriers to cross
picket lines so that the carriers could comply with the Motor Carrier
Act duties.246 In each case the Court's apparant rationale was that
the state court's jurisdiction was preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act; that is, the conduct enjoined was arguably protected
242. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 42 MCC 225, 230-31
(1943). Accord, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad
Co., 268 I.C.C. 257, 260 (1947).
243. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., 128 F. Supp. 475, 498
(D. Ore. 1953) (liability); 128 F. Supp. 520 (1954) (damages. The court erroneously believed
that a protection of rights clause guaranteeing employees' right to respect a picket line and the
employees' actual exercise of these rights were "illegal." But see Truck Drivers Local 413 v.
NLRB (Watson-Wilson Transportation Systems, Inc.), 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), ceri. denied,
379 U.S. 916 (1964).
244. Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 233 F.2d 296, 303-04 (8th Cir., cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 879 (1956); Merchandise Warehouse Co. v. ABC Freight Forwarding Corp.,
165 F. Supp. 67, 76 (S.D. Ind. 1958).
245. Pickup and Delivery Restrictions, California, Rail, 303 I.C.C. 579 (1958).
246. Bogle v. Jakes Foundry Co., 362 U.S. 401 (1960), rev'g., 46 Tenn. App. 309, 329
S.W.2d 364 (1959); McCrary v. Aladdin Radio Industries, Inc., 355 U.S. 8 (1957), rev'g., 42
Tenn. App. 52 298 S.W.2d 770 (1956); Teamsters Local 327 v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353
U.S. 968 (1957), rev', 41 Tenn. App. 467, 296 S.W.2d 379 (1956); General Drivers Local 89 v.
American Tobacco Co., 348 U.S. 978 (1955), rev'g., - Ky. -, 264 S.W.2d 250 (1954).
or arguably prohibited by the Act. The circle is, therefore, complete:
respect for a stranger picket line is arguably protected even when a
common carrier is involved, a reaffirmation of the Board's position.
Conflicts between statutory schemes should be resolved in favor
of the Act when a strike or sympathetic activity creates only poten-
tial civil liability. When however, criminal prohibitions attach to
otherwise protected activity, the Act must obviously yield to overrid-
ing federal authority.
V. Conclusion
With the Wagner Act, Congress recognized that employers
would rarely voluntarily yield to employees even a small measure of
control over their working lives, and established the ground rules for
the economic tests of strength between unions and management.
Employees could strike without subjecting themselves to employer
discrimination and blacklisting. Traditionally, however, the labor
movement has linked the right to strike with the right to respect a
picket line. The protection provided by Section 7 of the right to
honor a picket line recognizes the fundamental concepts of union-
ism: that single employees are helpless against large employers; that
in unity there is strength; that all employees will eventually benefit
from the gains won by each group of employees; and that over-all
improvements are possible only if employees do not assist employers
attempting to resist their employees' legitimate economic demands.
The National Labor Relations Board, whose charter directs it to
protect employee interests against assaults by both management and
labor, has long recognized the significance and legitimacy of the
right to respect a picket line. This right is no less significant when an
employee honors a picket line established by employees of another
employer. Thus, the Board has established criteria to balance the
competing interests of employees and employers in stranger picket
line situations, with the emphasis on protecting employee freedom of
choice.
Courts, on the other hand, have historically resisted employee
self-help efforts. Congress' efforts to restrict judicial interference
with the right to strike largely succeeded with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, but the Supreme Court has, only recently, held that several
courts had exceeded their jurisdiction by enjoining workers respect-
ing a picket line. Not surprisingly, the same courts that wrongfully
enjoined sympathy strikes are most skeptical of the stautory right to
respect a stranger picket line.
While Congress never expressly debated the right to respect a
primary picket line or most other Section 7 rights, the issue of sym-
pathy strikes was clearly raised. In 1935, Congress adopted the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act's definition of "protected activity,"
which encompassed sympathetic activity even absent a picket line.
Later, Congress prohibited secondary sympathetic activity, but ex-
pressly stated that the refusal to cross a picket line at another em-
ployer's place of business did not constitute prohibited secondary
conduct. Furthermore, the Board has advanced cogent reasons for
including sympathetic conduct within the rights of Section 7 to "as-
sist labor organizations" and to take concerted action for the pur-
poses of "mutual aid or protection." Although the Supreme Court in
Rockaway News Supply Co. rejected the opportunity to consider the
issue of sympathetic activity as a Section 7 right, the Court will be
asked to face the issue in the future. When it does, the Board's posi-
tion should be sustained.
JONATHAN G. AXELROD

